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Depression and Distress in Blacks and Whites in the US: 
Testing a Hypothesis to Explain a Double Paradox 
 
David M. Barnes 
 
This dissertation tested a methodological explanation for a double paradox in psychiatric 
epidemiology: a lower prevalence of major depression in Blacks than Whites in the US, coupled with 
equal and higher levels of psychological distress in Blacks. The first paradox is a lower prevalence of 
major depression in Blacks than Whites.  The second paradox is the discordant results from comparing 
Blacks and Whites on depression and distress.  These are paradoxes from the vantage points of, 
respectively, dominant theory and conceptual and empirical understandings of the relationship between 
disorder and distress. 
 
The idea that Blacks in the US express depression and distress more somatically than Whites has 
been in the literature for decades.  If true, it could explain the double paradox.   A formal diagnosis of 
major depression requires endorsing a screening symptom, either sad mood or anhedonia, which are 
both psychological rather than somatic symptoms.  To the extent Blacks express depression more 
somatically than Whites, depression could be disproportionately undercounted in Blacks due to a lower 
likelihood of Blacks endorsing a screening symptom, adjusting for underlying levels of depression.   
Measures of distress share symptom content with the diagnostic criteria for depression but typically do 
not require endorsing screening symptoms.  Thus, if Blacks do somatize depression and distress more 
somatically than Whites, the depression algorithm may produce a greater undercount of depression in 
 
Blacks than Whites, whereas a similar undercount would not occur with distress measures.  Accordingly, 
both paradoxes could be explained. 
 
This dissertation has three main parts.  In part one, the double paradox is documented in a 
systematic literature review.  Using data from two nationally representative household samples, parts 
two and three test whether Blacks express depression and distress, respectively, more somatically than 
Whites, whether this accounts for a lower likelihood of Blacks endorsing a screening symptom, and if 
(part two only) this explains the Black-White depression paradox. 
 
The systematic review provides robust evidence of the double paradox.  Parts two and three 
reveal slightly higher levels, respectively, of depression and distress somatization in Blacks than Whites.  
However, the underlying structure of these small differences provides no evidence of a broad 
somatization hypothesis in Blacks. Moreover, no evidence is found that the somatization difference 
inhibits Blacks’ endorsement of screening symptoms.  One unexpected finding points to subsequent 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation confronts a double paradox in psychiatric epidemiology: non-Hispanic Blacks 
have a lower prevalence of mental disorder than non-Hispanic Whites (hereafter Blacks and Whites), but 
equal and higher levels of psychological distress [1–6].  The first paradox is the lower prevalence of 
psychiatric disorder in Blacks than Whites.  The second paradox is discordant Black-White findings when 
the two groups are compared on mental disorder and distress.  These findings, respectively, are 
paradoxical from the vantage point of social stress theory and from the conceptual and empirical 
relationships between mental disorder and distress. 
 
Social stress theory is the dominant framework for interpreting relationships between social 
location and mental health [7–11]. This theory predicts that disadvantaged groups will have worse 
mental health than more advantaged groups.  The social, political, and economic disadvantages Blacks 
have experienced vis-à-vis Whites in the US, historically and in the present [12–14], make Black-White 
comparisons a particularly strong test [15] of the social stress paradigm.  The finding of better 
psychiatric health in Blacks than Whites therefore contradicts and potentially undermines this dominant 
paradigm. 
 
Regarding the second paradox, mental disorder and distress are distinct though overlapping 
constructs and they are generally positively associated in empirical findings.  The finding of less disorder 
but more distress in Blacks than Whites therefore contradicts these conceptual and empirical 




 This double paradox matters because it is consistently documented in the literature, because 
Black-White comparisons are a potent test of the social stress paradigm in the US context, and because 
it casts significant doubt on what we think we know about relationships between social position, mental 
disorder, and psychological distress. 
 
 Various substantive and methodological hypotheses have been proposed to account for the first 
paradox.  Substantive hypotheses start with the premise that the finding of lower disorder in Blacks than 
Whites is valid and they have tended to posit a protective factor more prevalent in Blacks than Whites.  
In contrast, methodological explanations presume the finding is invalid and that it stems from flawed 
research.  To date, however, these hypotheses have not been sufficiently tested, or test results have not 
confirmed them, and the paradox persists.  The second paradox, by contrast, has received virtually no 
research attention. 
 
 This dissertation pursues a methodological explanation for both paradoxes.  It is motivated by 
the idea that good, or good enough theories are rare and should not be discarded in the face of 
contravening evidence until all tests of plausible methodological explanations have failed.  Contrarily, 
one could assert that no theory can be expected to predict accurately every time.  While this is a 
defensible position, the Black-White mental disorder findings derive from a critical test of social stress 
theory and should be confronted head-on rather than tolerated as aberrations.  In the vein of theory 
conservation, this dissertation targets the disorder rather than distress findings (the latter of which, 
after all, conform to social stress theory predictions) in testing a methodological explanation.  Obviously 
any psychiatric diagnosis is too broad a category to explore in one dissertation; therefore, the focus is on 
major depressive disorder.  Major depression is the focal disorder because the Black-White prevalence 
difference is relatively pronounced for depression, and ironically, distress measures generally draw from 
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the symptoms of depression more than from other disorders.  Given this symptom overlap, and equal 
and higher levels of distress in Blacks than Whites, one might therefore expect Blacks to have equal and 
higher levels of depression than Whites.  That Blacks have a relatively pronounced lower prevalence 
than Whites of major depression suggests a disorder where methodological error might be more easily 
detected. 
 
 The second chapter reports the results from a systematic literature review comparing Blacks and 
Whites on major depression and distress from nationally representative US samples.  The third and 






Chapter 2: Documenting a double paradox: a systematic literature review comparing Blacks and 





Commentators frequently note that US studies find an equal and lower prevalence of most 
psychiatric disorders in Blacks than Whites, but also equal and higher levels of psychological distress in 
Blacks [2–6, 14, 16, 17]. If these sources accurately summarize the published findings, a double paradox 
emerges.  But are they accurate?  Because a systematic review of this literature has never been 
published, the empirical footing of these paradoxes is unclear. 
 
The first paradox is the discordance between the mental disorder findings and what the social 
stress paradigm leads us to expect. This paradigm is the dominant framework for interpreting 
relationships between social position and mental health [7–11] and predicts that disadvantaged groups 
will have worse mental health than more advantaged groups by virtue of greater stressor exposure and 
access to fewer coping resources.  The social stress paradigm can be distinguished from the stress 
paradigm in that the latter considers only the relationship between stressor exposure and health 
outcomes whereas the former also considers upstream social factors that pattern stressor exposure and 
coping resources. Blacks’ uniquely marginalized political, economic, and social status in the US [12–14] 
makes Black-White comparisons a particularly strong test [15] of the social stress paradigm. Accordingly, 
from the vantage point of this paradigm, the consistent finding of an equal and lower prevalence of 




The second paradox is the discordant mental disorder and psychological distress (hereafter 
distress) findings in Black-White comparisons.  Psychiatric disorder and distress are overlapping, though 
distinct constructs.  Both constructs define aversive mental states, are frequently measured with similar 
symptoms [18, 19], and are phenomenologically related [21, 22].  However, a distinction is often made 
that disorder represents dysfunction in the individual whereas distress does not assume such internal 
dysfunction but more often indicates the presence of stressors in the individual’s environment to which 
the expectable response is psychological distress [22, 23].   The constructs can be causally related when, 
for example, internal mental dysfunctions give rise to psychological distress or chronic distress arising 
from chronic stressor exposure makes a person more vulnerable to developing internal mental 
dysfunctions [19–21].  Because of these links, we should expect that those with a psychiatric disorder 
would score higher on measures of distress than those without a disorder, and that those scoring higher 
on distress measures would be more likely to have a psychological disorder than those scoring lower.  In 
fact, empirical evidence documents these associations between depression and distress [24–26].   These 
findings suggest that in between-group comparisons, the group with a higher prevalence of disorder 
should also have a higher level of distress.  The apparent lack of such concordance in Black-White 
comparisons in the US thus signifies the second paradox. 
 
Because these ostensible paradoxes occur between two groups where the gap in advantages is 
stark, they cannot be easily dismissed as tolerable exceptions to the apparent rule.  That is, because 
these paradoxes arise in a comparison that clearly exemplifies the elements of the social stress model, 
they undermine the paradigm and our often tacit [2, 16, 27] reliance on it when interpreting 
relationships between social location and mental health.  It is therefore important to systematically 
document the published findings comparing Blacks and Whites in the US on mental disorder and distress, 
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paying special attention to the robustness of the patterns.  If there are paradoxes are to be resolved, 
systematically documenting them is a logical first step. 
 
In this paper, I report findings from a systematic review of the literature estimating the 
prevalence of major depression and levels of psychological distress in Blacks and Whites in the US.  
Among disorders, I focus on major depression for four reasons.   First, a cursory literature review 
suggests that Blacks’ lower prevalence than Whites of the multiple psychiatric disorders diagnosed in 
the large, nationally representative epidemiology studies conducted since 1980 (the advent of the 
current psychiatric nosology) is particularly marked for major depression.  Second, among mental 
disorders, major depression is especially vulnerable to stressor exposure [28–31], and hence the Black-
White depression finding is a particularly strong challenge to the dominant interpretive model.  Third, 
distress measures typically borrow heavily from the diagnostic criteria for major depression; thus, 
discordance between depression and distress findings in Black-White comparisons is particularly 
paradoxical. And fourth, because major depression is among the two or three most prevalent psychiatric 
disorders in the general population [32, 33], paradoxical findings with respect to it have significant 
implications for public health. 
 
This review draws only on studies using nationally representative samples of adults in the US, 
the population in which the paradoxes have been primarily noted.  Furthermore, although the degree of 
America’s racialized climate may vary geographically, this climate  – historically and currently -- is 
nevertheless ubiquitous.  This review also does not consider subgroups defined by immigrant status, 
ancestry, or any other variable.  In a racialized America, physiognomy often trumps these important 
subgroup differences in shaping life experiences, and therefore crude race comparisons remain telling.  
Finally, and crucially, results are excluded that adjust for socioeconomic variables such as income, 
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wealth, education, employment, and marital status because these are core explanatory levers, along 
with inter-personal discrimination, of the social stress paradigm.  To include results adjusting for these 
mediators is to remove key factors that link social location to mental health.  Accordingly, only results 





 The literature review was conducted in PubMed and PsycINFO databases.   The search term 
algorithm (Table 1) was designed to identify articles reporting on Black-White differences in depression 
or distress in representative samples of the US population.  I sequentially culled articles by title, abstract, 
and full article review, applying the following inclusion criteria: nationally representative US adult 
samples in which data are reported comparing Blacks and Whites on either major depression or 
psychological distress. In the full article review phase, articles were retained if they satisfied these 
inclusion criteria and if the unadjusted results, or adjusted at most for age and sex, were reported.  
When two or more articles reported results from the same study, articles providing prevalence data 
were selected over those reporting odds ratios.  From on-going or multi-year studies, articles reporting 
results over a longer range of years were selected over those reporting results from a subset of these 
years. A secondary literature review was conducted, using these same inclusion criteria, of the 
references of all articles finally selected from the primary review. 
 
 Results were categorized by whether they estimated the occurrence of major depression or 
distress.   “Major depression” is used here as a broad term to encompass both major depressive episode 
and major depressive disorder.  The difference between major depressive episode and major depressive 
 
8 
disorder is that the symptoms of a small minority of individuals who meet criteria for a major depressive 
episode are better accounted for by a psychotic disorder or another mood disorder with manic elements 
(e.g., manic-depressive disorder), in which case they receive a psychotic or manic-related diagnosis 
rather than a major depressive disorder diagnosis.  Therefore, major depressive episode is not a disorder, 
per se, though in fact most individuals meeting criteria for a major depressive episode receive a major 
depressive disorder diagnosis rather than one of the other diagnoses [23]. Because this overlap is large, 
studies reporting major depressive episode as an outcome were included in this review in addition to 
those reporting major depressive disorder. 
 
The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 and -8 (PHQ-9 and PHQ-8) are often presented in the 
literature as measures of major depression [34].  In this review, however, the PHQs were categorized as 
distress measures because they fall far short of fully implementing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) major depression criteria. For example, in the PHQ, symptoms are counted 
towards the five-symptom minimum required in the DSM major depressive episode algorithm if they 
were endorsed as occurring during at least half the days during a minimum two-week period, whereas 
the DSM stipulates that they occur nearly every day.  Further, the PHQs require that the symptom 
occurs at all during the day whereas the DSM requires that, where relevant, the symptom occurs most 
of the day.  As Horwitz and Wakefield [23] persuasively argue, non-disordered distress sometimes 
satisfies the DSM criteria for major depression, leading to misclassification as the latter; thus, any 
loosening of the DSM criteria – as occurs with the PHQ -- opens the door still further to false positive 
diagnoses. 
 
Distress results were subdivided between those comparing Blacks and Whites on the 
proportions in each group with high distress scores (a threshold determined by each study) and those 
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comparing the two groups on their mean distress scores.  I calculated prevalence ratios and means 
ratios, respectively, from the results.  I also used openepi.com to calculate 95 percent confidence 
intervals around the prevalence ratios when studies provided Black and White sample sizes, and 95 
percent confidence intervals around group means when papers provided standard deviations or 
standard errors but not the confidence intervals themselves.  T-tests of differences in mean distress 






The literature review (schematically summarized in Figure 1) generated 32 articles reporting 44 
relevant outcomes. Seven articles [35–41] report 9 Black-White comparative findings on the prevalence 
of major depression.  The remaining 25 articles [4, 42–65] report 35 distress comparisons between 
Blacks and Whites. 
 
In studies documenting major depression, the Black and White samples ranged in size, 
respectively, from 666 to 8,245 and from 4,180 to 31,938.  These figures for the studies reporting 




Figure 2 and Table 2 summarize the nine major depression comparisons.  Blacks have a lower 
prevalence than Whites in eight comparisons; six of these differences are statistically significant as 
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indicated by the prevalence ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals (these ranged in width from 0.09 
to 0.27 and at the upper end do not extend above 0.91), and in one case a p-value < 0.001. In the one 
instance in which Blacks have a higher prevalence of major depression than Whites, the 95 percent 
confidence interval extends well below 1.  Regarding diagnostic timeframes, Blacks have a statistically 
significantly lower prevalence than Whites in all four lifetime comparisons, in two of three past-year 





Figure 3 and Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c summarize Black-White prevalence ratios of scoring over the 
cut-points specific to each study.  A higher proportion of Blacks than Whites score over the cut-points in 
24 of 25 comparisons.  Of these 24 comparisons, 19 are statistically significant (based on 95 percent 
confidence intervals or significance test results (p < 0.05)) and five are not.  In the one study reporting a 
higher prevalence in Whites, the difference is statistically significant. 
 
 Figure 4 and Table 4 summarize Black-White distress means ratios.  Blacks have higher mean 
distress scores than Whites in all 10 comparisons.  Two of these differences are statistically significant, 
two are not statistically significant, and six are indeterminate because neither the standard deviations 
nor standard errors of the mean estimates were provided. 
 
 For distress overall, Blacks have higher levels than Whites in 34 of 35 comparisons; of these 34, 
21 are statistically significant, seven are not statistically significant, and six are indeterminate.  In the 
one case where Whites have higher distress than Blacks, the difference is statistically significant.  The 
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weighted average prevalence ratio was 1.38 and the weighted average means ratio was 1.17.  These 
averages were obtained by weighting each study’s Black-White prevalence or means ratio by the study’s 
Black and White sample size, and assigning the average study sample size to studies where sample size 
is not reported. 
  
In sum, Blacks have a lower prevalence of major depression than Whites in eight of 9 
comparisons; six of these differences are statistically significant.  In none of the 9 major depression 
comparisons do Blacks have a statistically significant higher prevalence than Whites.  Blacks have higher 
distress levels than Whites in 34 of 35 comparisons.  Of the 29 comparisons in which the statistical 
significance of the differences can be tested, Blacks are statistically significantly higher than Whites in 21 
comparisons, Whites are statistically significantly higher in one comparison, and there is no statistically 





 Blacks have a lower prevalence of major depression than Whites in eight of nine comparisons 
but higher distress levels in 34 of 35 comparisons. These results from a systematic review of the 
literature are consistent with the observations in the literature based on cursory reviews [2–4, 6].  In 
short, psychiatric epidemiology research fairly consistently finds that Blacks have less major depressive 
disorder but higher distress levels than Whites in the US. 
 
 As noted at the outset, this pattern signifies a double paradox.  The first paradox, from the 
perspective of the social stress paradigm, is that Blacks have a lower prevalence of major depression 
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than Whites, despite having a disadvantaged status in the US.  The second paradox is that Black-White 
comparisons of major depression and distress are discordant.  Blacks have a lower prevalence of 
depression than Whites but higher levels of distress, despite evidence in the broader literature of a 
strong positive association between major depression and distress [24–26]. 
 
Both artifactual and substantive explanations have been proposed to resolve the first paradox.  
Artifactual explanations presume the findings are invalid due to methodological error. Substantive 
explanations, on the other hand, presume that the lower prevalence of major depression in Blacks than 
Whites is valid and have tended to posit protective factors thought to be more prevalent in Blacks than 
Whites, such as religiosity, and high levels of self-esteem, ethnic identity, and social support [4, 36, 66, 
67] to account for the pattern.  The second paradox, however, undermines these explanations to the 
extent that the hypotheses fail to account for why factors protective against major depression do not 
similarly protect against distress.  Thus, the second paradox poses challenges to substantive 
explanations for the first.  As well, the social stress paradigm predicts worse mental health outcomes in 
disadvantaged groups in part by virtue of poorer coping resources.  To explain the paradox of a lower 
prevalence of depression in Blacks than Whites by virtue of better coping resources simply recreates the 
paradox at the locus of the hypothesized mediator, and entails a new paradox to explain. 
 
Empirical tests of substantive explanations have not provided support for these hypotheses to 
date.  Examples include examining whether better social support in Blacks than Whites explains Blacks’ 
lower prevalence of major depression [66, 68].  Despite operationalizing social networks in numerous 
ways, neither set of researchers found support for this explanation.  Results from similar tests of self-
esteem, ethnic identity, and religiosity as explanatory factors have not been published, to my knowledge.  
A more recent substantive hypothesis [4] proposes an interaction between race, stress, and poor health 
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behaviors (e.g., alcohol consumption) such that at higher stressor levels, unhealthy behaviors are more 
protective against depression in Blacks than in Whites, while simultaneously leading to worse somatic 
health in Blacks.  Tests of this hypothesis have had mixed results [4, 69, 70].  Moreover, a convincing 
explanation is lacking for why coping behaviors, engaged in to alleviate distress, would protect against 
psychopathology rather than the distress target [5]. 
 
Among methodological explanations for the Black-White depression paradox, one posits that 
selection bias in the household sample-based studies that document the paradox, disproportionately 
undercounts depression in Blacks [10, 71–73].  Specifically, the explanation contends that Blacks are 
disproportionately represented in the groups excluded from household samples (e.g., the incarcerated, 
homeless, and those living on military bases), which also have a relatively high prevalence of disorder.  
For this methodological explanation of the Black-White depression paradox to succeed, we would 
expect to see stronger evidence of the paradox in demographic subgroups where these selection factors 
are more operant (young males with lower educational achievement), and weaker evidence where they 
are less operant (older females with higher educational achievement).  However, a recent study tested 
this explanation and found uniform evidence of the paradox across 24 subgroups cross-tabulated by age, 
sex, and education [74], thus providing evidence inconsistent with this selection bias explanation. 
 
Another methodological explanation for the first paradox suggests that the diagnostic interview 
for depression used in epidemiologic studies captures depression more effectively in Whites than Blacks 
[2, 27, 75, 76].  For example, Breslau et al [27] and Uebelacker et al [76] test whether differential item 
functioning between Blacks and Whites in the diagnostic interview for depression explains any of the 
paradox.  Differential item functioning occurs when two or more groups differ in their probabilities of 
endorsing specific symptoms, conditioning on the latent construct. Though both detect small levels of 
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differential item functioning between Blacks and Whites on several symptoms, it is insufficient in both 
cases to explain a meaningful portion of the depression paradox. 
 
These two tests are hindered, however, by using samples in which all participants have already 
endorsed at least one of the two screening symptoms for depression (sad mood and anhedonia), and 
thus selection into the samples is conditioned on a factor many have suggested Blacks and Whites differ 
on and which is relevant for diagnosis.  Specifically, some clinicians and researchers [77–81] have 
observed that Blacks are more likely than Whites in the US to experience and/or express depression 
more somatically (i.e., physically), versus more psychologically.  A tendency to express depression more 
somatically would theoretically inhibit endorsing the more psychologically oriented screening symptoms.  
Because endorsing a screening symptom is required for a depression diagnosis, failing to do so results in 
skipping out of the remainder of the depression interview.  Consequently, those selecting into the full 
depression interview are more homogenous on a somatization-psychologization continuum than is the 
full sample that was asked the screen questions. Tests of differential item functioning in this more 
homogenous sample are therefore theoretically less able to detect differential item functioning 
between Blacks and Whites 
 
Importantly, if Blacks and Whites do in fact differ on this somatization-psychologization 
continuum, it could lead to disproportionately undercounting depression in Blacks since diagnosis 
requires endorsement of one of the two screeners.  By contrast, no endorsement of somatic symptoms 
(which comprise four of the nine diagnostic symptom criteria for major depression) is required for 
diagnosis.  This observation of greater depression somatization in Blacks than Whites in fact suggests a 




The distress findings reported in this review lend support to this somatization explanation for 
the first paradox because distress measures typically assign equal weights to all items, while the 
depression interview gives greater weight to the psychological over the somatic expression of 
depression. Future studies testing for differential item functioning between Blacks and Whites in the 
major depression diagnostic interview should sidestep the limitation of the Breslau et al and Uebelacker 
et al studies [27, 76] by using a design in which the full interview is conducted among the entire sample. 
 
Substantive and methodological explanations for the first paradox have different implications 
for the social stress paradigm.  A core precept of the paradigm is a main effect of social disadvantage on 
health – that is, disadvantaged groups will have worse health than more advantaged groups -- yet 
substantive explanations for the first paradox start with the premise that the finding of a lower 
prevalence of psychopathology in Blacks than Whites is valid.  This suggests the conclusion that 
psychopathology is either positively associated with social advantage or that social advantage is 
unrelated to psychopathology, both of which are patently inconsistent with the paradigm.  If social 
disadvantage is unrelated to psychopathology, then looking upstream for causes of psychopathology 
would not need to extend as far as group membership, in which case the social stress paradigm reduces 
to the stress paradigm. 
 
Accepting the Black-White major depression results (or, more broadly, the psychiatric disorder 
results) as valid could imply something else, however: that the social stress paradigm is undiminished 
because psychiatric disorder outcomes imperfectly capture the universe of relevant mental health 
outcomes [2], or that results contradicting it are tolerable aberrations to the rule [10, 82]. For example, 
Brown [2] writes: “Racial stratification can cause mental health problems (among both Blacks and 
Whites) not systematically described in the existing literatures or psychiatric nosology” (p. 293).  
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Regarding tolerable exceptions, Aneshensel [82] writes: “In sum, location in the social system influences 
the probability of encountering stressors, which in turn increase the probability of becoming 
emotionally distressed; these relationships may occur only among some groups, or only under certain 
conditions” (p. 19).  The problem with both arguments is that they risk rendering the social stress 
paradigm non-falsifiable.  To falsify a paradigm or theory is to produce evidence contradicting its 
predictions, thereby weakening our confidence in it.    For a theory to be scientifically useful and not a 
statement of faith, it must be testable and therefore vulnerable to tests that can shake our confidence in 
it.  To offer caveats that the universe of outcomes is larger than those tested in any given instance, or 
that a paradigm’s predictions may not materialize in all groups, leaves one open to the criticism of non-
falsifiability -- to the critique that contravening evidence can always be explained away, thus making the 
theory invulnerable to falsification.   The first caveat would need to reckon with the fact that the Black-
White depression paradox extends to most other psychiatric disorders as well, including anxiety and 
substance use disorders.  The second caveat is particularly problematic in Black-White comparisons, 
which represent an optimal test of the social stress paradigm.   Inconsistency between a theory’s 
predictions and the findings may in fact be tolerable in weaker tests of the theory, but when strong tests 
fail, the theory ought to come under suspicion.   
 
A more conservative approach to resolving the first paradox is to set aside substantive 
explanations while first testing all plausible artifactual explanations.  This approach has the advantage of 
not disposing of good, or good enough theory prematurely.  In any case, results of this systematic review 
demonstrate that proposed explanations for the first paradox must contend with the second paradox to 
succeed.  To this end, work remains to be done examining differences and commonalities in how 




Table 1. Search term algorithm 
Articles were included for title review if they satisfied criteria A 
or B, and C, and D, and E. 
A African OR 
  Black OR 
  Negro   
  AND 
  European OR 
  White OR 
  Caucasian   
  OR 
B ethnic OR 
  ethnicity OR 
  race OR 
  “nationally representative” OR 
  “national probability sample”   
  AND 
C “major depression” OR 
  “major depressive disorder” OR 
  “mental disorders” OR 
  “psychiatric disorders” OR 
  “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders” [Mesh] 
OR 
  depression OR 
  “depressive symptomatology” OR 
  “psychological distress” OR 
  distress OR 
  “psychological stress”   
  AND 
D Human [Mesh]   
  AND 








Table 2. Summary of findings comparing Blacks and Whites on prevalence of major depression. 
Source Study Data 
Collection 
Period 

















            
Lifetime prevalence                   
Weissman et al. (1991) ECA 1981 DIS MDD NR NR 3.1
4
 5.1 0.61 
Blazer et al. (1994) NCS 1990-1992 CIDI MDE 931 6,098 11.9 (8.76 - 15.04) 17.9 (16.33 - 19.47) 0.67 (0.56 - 0.80) 
Breslau et al. (2006) NCS-R 2001-2003 CIDI MDD 717 4,180 10.8 (8.45 - 13.15) 17.9 (16.53 - 19.27) 0.60 (0.48 - 0.75) 




 8.93 (8.02 - 9.87) 14.58 (14.01 - 15.15) 0.61 (0.57 - 0.66) 
            
Last 12 months prevalence               




 2.48 (2.01 - 2.95) 3.5 (3.27 - 3.74) 0.71 (0.60 - 0.84) 
US DHHS (2001) NCS 1990-1992 CIDI MD 666 4,498 8.2 (6.04 - 10.36) 9.9 (8.72 - 11.08) 0.84 (0.64 - 1.09) 




 4.52 (3.89 - 5.15) 5.53 (5.20 - 1.84) 0.82 (0.73 - 0.91) 
            
Last 30 days prevalence               
Regier et al. (1993) ECA 1981 DIS MDE 4,287 12,606
7
 2.5 (1.91 - 3.09) 2.2 (1.81 - 2.59)  1.14 (0.91 - 1.42) 
Blazer et al. (1994) NCS 1990-1992 CIDI MDE 931 6,098 3.8 (1.84 - 5.76) 4.7 (3.92 - 5.48) 0.80 (0.57 - 1.13) 
Notes. US DHHS = United States Department of Health and Human Services; ECA = Epidemiologic Catchment Area; NCS = National Comorbidity Survey; NCS-R = National Comorbidity 
Survey – Replication; NESARC = National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions; NLAES = National Longitudinal Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey; DIS = Diagnostic 
Interview Schedule;  CIDI =  Composite International Diagnostic Interview; AUDADIS-IV =  Alcohol Use Disorder and Associated Disabilities Interview Schedule - DSM-IV Version ; MDD = 
major depressive disorder; MDE = major depressive episode; MD = major depression; NR = not reported. 
1
 unweighted          
2
 weighted to the US population        
3
 prevalence ratios and confidence intervals estimated by DM Barnes       
4
 p < 0.001          
5 
source: Hasin, DS, et al., 2007        
6
 estimated by DM Barnes       
7






Table 3a. Summary of findings comparing Blacks and Whites on prevalence of high distress, last 12 months        
Source Study Data 
Collection 
Period 























             
Last 12 months                 









threshold on at least 2 of 
4 dimensions, one of 
which had to be 
depression or anxiety 







            
Worst month in last 12 months                
Harris et al. 
(2005) 
NSDUH 2001-2003 K6 ≥ 13 15,222 94,393 5.32 (4.67 - 
5.97) 
6.49 (6.26 - 
6.73) 
0.82 (0.76 - 
0.88) 
  
Notes. NSDUH = National Survey on Drug Use and Health; HSC = Hopkins Symptom Checklist; K6 = Kessler 6; Black = non-Hispanic Black; White = non-Hispanic 





weighted to the US population
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Last 30 days                    
Pratt (2009) NHIS 1997-2000 K6 ≥ 13 13,734 92,270 4.02 3.21 1.25 (1.15 - 1.37) Black-White 
OR, adjusting 
for age and 
sex = 1.3, 
95% CI (1.1 - 
1.4) 
Dey & Lucas (2006) NHIS 1998-2003 K6 ≥ 13 NR NR 3.3 (3.01 - 3.59) 2.7 (2.56 - 2.84) 1.22 US-born only 
Oraka et al. (2010) NHIS 2001-2007 K6 ≥ 13 21,101 134,265 3.5 2.85 1.23 (1.14 - 1.33)   
Reeves et al. (2011)  NHIS 2009 K6 ≥ 13 4,374 16,187 3.8 (3.0 - 4.7) 3.2 (2.8 - 3.6) 1.19 (1.0 - 1.41)   
Strine et al. (2009) BRFSS  2007 K6 ≥ 13 NR NR 6.1 (5.1 - 7.2) 3.4 (3.2 - 3.5) 1.79   
Reeves et al. (2011)  BRFSS 2009 K6 ≥ 13 8,410 68,335 5.4 (4.5 - 6.4) 3.5 (3.2 - 3.9) 1.54 (1.40 - 1.70)   
Dismuke & Egede (2011) MEPS 2007 K6 ≥ 13 2,034 12,673 6.15 5.7 1.08 (0.90 - 1.30) t-test p > 
0.05 
CDC (2004) BRFSS  1993-2001 poor mental health days ≥ 14 NR NR 9.9 (9.6- 10.2) 8.7 (8.6 - 8.8) 1.14 adjusted for 
age and sex 
Chowdhury et al. (2008) BRFSS  2001-2002 poor mental health days ≥ 14 14,937 153,290 11.2 (10.4 - 12.0) 9.5 (9.3 - 9.8) 1.18 (1.12 - 1.24)   
Mukherjee et al. (2013) BRFSS  2011 poor mental health days ≥ 14 41,056 396,273 13.46 10.15 1.33 (1.29 - 1.36)   
Zahran et al (2005) NHANES  2001-2002 poor mental health days ≥ 14 1,009 2,602 4.5 (3.6 - 5.4) 3.6 (3.2 - 4.0) 1.24 (0.87 - 1.75)   
Chowdhury et al. (2008) BRFSS  2001-2002 days sad, blue, or 
depressed 
≥ 14 7,067 72,107 10.6 (9.3 - 11.9) 7.9 (7.6 - 8.3) 1.34 (1.25 - 1.44)   
Fiscella & Franks (1997) NHANES 1971-1974 GWB depression subscale ≤13 NR NR 16.6 (13.9 - 19.29) 8.9 (7.94 - 9.86) 1.86   
Wu & Anthony (2000) NHSDA  1995-1996 felt sad, blue, or depressed, 
or lost interest in most 
things  
endorsed ≥ 1 NR NR 1.11 1.0 (ref) 1.11 (0.79 - 1.56)  odds ratio 
Notes.  NHIS = National Health Interview Survey; BRFSS = Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey; MEPS = Medical Expenditure Panel Survey; NHANES = National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey; NHSDA 
= National Household Survey on Drug Abuse; K6 = Kessler 6; GWB = General Well-Being; Black = non-Hispanic Black; White = non-Hispanic White; NR = not reported; all sample sizes are weighted to the US 




weighted to the US population  
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 Table 3c. Summary of findings comparing Blacks and Whites on prevalence of high distress, last 2 weeks and last 7 days       
Source Study Data 
Collection 
Period 


















             
Last 2 weeks                  
Reeves et al. 
(2011) 
NHANES 2005-2008 PHQ9 ≥ 10 2,273 4,882 9.7 (7.9, 11.5) 6.2 (5.0, 7.4) 1.57 (1.33 - 1.85)   
CDC (2010) BRFSS  2006-2008 PHQ8 ≥ 5 symptoms more 
than half the days, 
including at least one 
depression screener 
("MDD") 
17,604 183,563 4.0 (3.6, 4.6) 3.1 (2.9, 3.2) 1.29 (1.20 - 1.39)   
CDC (2010) BRFSS  2006-2008 PHQ8 2-4 symptoms more 
than half the days 
("Other depression") 
17,604 183,563 8.7 (7.9, 9.7) 4.8 (4.6, 5.0) 1.81 (1.72 - 1.91)   
CDC (2010) BRFSS  2006-2008 PHQ8 any depression 
(either "MDD" or 
"other depression") 
17,604 183,563 12.8 (11.8, 13.8) 7.9 (7.6, 8.1) 1.62 (1.55 - 1.70)   
Reeves et al. 
(2011) 
BRFSS  2006 PHQ8 ≥ 10 15,819 153,642 11.0 (10.1, 12.1) 8.0 (7.7, 8.3) 1.38 (1.31 - 1.44)    
Reeves et al. 
(2011) 
BRFSS  2008 PHQ8 ≥ 10 4,837 68,695 12.7 (11.1, 14.6) 7.5 (7.1, 7.9) 1.69 (1.57 - 1.83)   
             
Last 7 days                    
Eaton & Kessler 
(1981) 
NHANES 1975 CES-D ≥ 16 242 2,625 28.5 15.3 1.86 (1.50 - 2.32)   
Jackson et al. 
(2010) 








NAS 1984 CES-D ≥ 16 1,947 1,777 20.3 15.1 1.35 (1.17 - 1.55) Chi-square 
test p < 
0.001 
Notes. NHANES = National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey; BRFSS = Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey; NHANES = National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey; ACL = Americans 
Changing Lives Survey; NAS = National Alcohol Survey; PHQ = Patient Health Questionnaire; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies - Depression; Black = non-Hispanic Black; White = non-Hispanic 




 prevalence ratio confidence intervals estimated by DM Barnes 
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Means Ratio  
Notes 
            
Last 30 days                   
Bratter & Eschbach 
(2005) 
NHIS 1997-2001 K6 (range 0-24) 22,128 107,420 2.41 2.36 1.02 t-test p > 0.05; regression 
parameter adjusted for age and 
sex p > 0.05 
Kiviniemi et al. 
(2011) 
HINTS 2007 K6 (range 0-24) 580 4,588 1.92 (1.82 - 
2.01) 
1.82 (1.79 - 
1.85) 
1.06 SD & SE not reported 
Roxburgh (2009) NHIS 2003 K6 (range 6-30) 3,751 21,247 8.66 (8.54 - 
8.78) 
8.48 (8.42 - 
8.54) 
1.07 DM Barnes estimated SE from SD; 
t-test = -2.51, p = 0.01 
Reeves et al. (2011) BRFSS  2009 poor mental health 
days 
33,741 333,119 4.1 (3.9 - 4.4) 3.3 (3.2 - 3.4) 1.24 SD & SE not reported 
Nuru-Jeter et al. 
(2008) 
MHS 1994 five-item Mental 
Health Inventory 
(range 5-30) 
995 1,102 11 (10.73 - 
11.27) 
10.7 (10.45 - 
10.96) 
1.03 t-test = 1.57, p = 0.12; D Barnes 
estimated SE from SD; weighted 
estimates 
Fleischman (2007) MEPS  2004 K6 + PHQ9 (2 items) + 
Short Form 2 (2 items) 
2,001 12,915 17.62 16.68 1.06 sample sizes estimated by DM 
Barnes; SD & SE not reported 
            
Last 7 days                   
Eaton & Kessler 
(1981) 
NHANES 1975 CES-D (8 items) 242 2,625 10.9 8.4 1.3 SD & SE not reported 
Mulia et al. (2008) NAS 2005 CES-D (8 items) 1,054 3,967 3.96 3.27 1.21 SD & SE not reported 
   
 
     
 
  
Various time frames in last 30 days             
Kessler & Neighbors 
(1986) 
various 1967 - 1976 various depression 
screening scales 
1,411 8,307 1.24 1 1.24 SD & SE not reported 
Kessler & Neighbors 
(1986) 
various 1957 - 1976 various somatization 
screening scales 
3,040 19,404 1.1 1 1.1 SD & SE not reported 
Notes. NHIS = National Health Interview Survey; HINTS = Health Information National Trends Survey; BRFSS = Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey; MHS = Minority Health Survey; MEPS = 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey; NHANES = National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey; NAS = National Alcohol Survey; K6 = Kessler 6; PHQ = Patient Health Questionnaire; CES-D = Center 
for Epidemiologic Studies - Depression; Black = non-Hispanic Black; White = non-Hispanic White; SD = standard deviation; SE = standard error; all sample sizes are weighted to the US population; all 
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Figure 2-4. Black-White ratios of distress means 
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In the large US psychiatric epidemiology studies using representative household samples, non-
Hispanic Blacks consistently have a lower prevalence than non-Hispanic Whites (hereafter Blacks and 
Whites) of nearly all psychiatric disorders [32, 36, 83, 84], a finding often pronounced for major 
depression [35, 36, 38, 85].  Studies using similar samples also show, however, that Blacks frequently 
have equal or higher levels of psychological distress (hereafter distress) than Whites [4, 59, 61, 86].  This 
pattern of findings suggests a double paradox. 
 
The first paradox is that the Black-White disorder findings contradict the predictions of the 
social stress paradigm, the dominant framework for understanding the relationship between social 
position and mental health [7–11].  Whether acknowledged explicitly [4] or more tacitly [2, 16, 27], this 
paradigm widely governs our expectations of how social status is related to mental health.  The 
paradigm posits that disadvantaged social groups will have worse mental health outcomes than more 
advantaged groups because of greater stressor exposure and diminished access to coping resources [4, 
87–91].  Black-White comparisons are a strong test [15] of this prediction in the American context given 
Blacks’ disadvantaged social, political, and economic status vis-à-vis Whites, both historically and in the 
present [12–14, 92].  From the framework of the social stress paradigm it is therefore paradoxical that 
the US psychiatric epidemiology studies using nationally representative household samples produce 




most individual disorders as well [32, 36, 83, 84].  This finding is pronounced for major depressive 
disorder [35, 36, 38, 85]. 
 
The second paradox is the discordant Black-White disorder and distress findings in Black-White 
comparisons.  Psychiatric disorder and psychological distress are overlapping, though distinct constructs.  
Both constructs define aversive mental states, are frequently measured with similar symptoms, and are 
phenomenologically related [18–21].  However, a distinction is often made that disorder represents 
dysfunction in the individual whereas distress does not assume such internal dysfunction but more often 
indicates the presence of stressors in the individual’s environment to which the expectable response is 
distress [22, 23].   The constructs can be causally related when, for example, internal mental 
dysfunctions give rise to psychological distress or when chronic distress arising from chronic stressor 
exposure makes a person more vulnerable to developing internal mental dysfunctions [23].  Because of 
these links, we expect that those with a psychiatric disorder would score higher on distress measures 
than those without a disorder, and that those scoring higher on distress measures would be more likely 
to have a psychological disorder than those scoring lower.  In fact, empirical evidence documents these 
associations between depression and distress [24–26].   These findings suggest that in between-group 
comparisons, the group with a higher prevalence of disorder should also have a higher level of distress.  
The apparent lack of such concordance in Black-White comparisons in the US thus constitutes the 
second paradox. 
 
Resolving these paradoxes matters for two reasons.  First, the Black-White disorder findings 
undermine our common and often tacit reliance on the social stress paradigm to predict and understand 
how social position relates to mental health.  When a strong test fails to support the paradigm, its 




comparisons likewise potentially undermines how we conceptualize and measure perhaps the two most 
fundamental constructs in mental health outcomes research, disorder and distress [8, 93, 94]. 
 
Regarding the first paradox, explanations have not found robust empirical support thus far. For 
the most part, these explanations have focused on the major depression finding, where the lower 
prevalence of disorder in Blacks is pronounced.  One type of explanation is substantive and starts with 
the assumption that the findings are valid. Examples of substantive explanations include positing greater 
levels in Blacks than Whites of religiosity and racial socialization [36], self-esteem [67], and social 
networks [66], factors thought to have protective dimensions for mental health [95–97, 97–102]. To my 
knowledge, only the social networks hypothesis has been tested, and the findings do not support it [66, 
68].  Another example is a recent hypothesis [4, 103] proposing an interaction between race, stress, and 
poor health behaviors (e.g., overeating) such that at higher stressor levels, these behaviors are more 
protective against depression in Blacks than in Whites, while simultaneously leading to worse somatic 
health outcomes in Blacks.  Tests of this hypothesis have had mixed results [4, 69, 70] . 
 
A different type of explanation is artifactual and, accordingly, attributes the findings of a lower 
prevalence of psychiatric disorder in Blacks to methodological error.  Artifactual explanations for the 
Black-White depression paradox include a greater tendency to misdiagnose depression as a psychotic 
spectrum disorder in Blacks than Whites [104–106], and differential item functioning between Blacks 
and Whites of the items used to diagnose major depression [27].  Differential item functioning occurs 
when groups have different probabilities of endorsing an item or symptom, controlling for underlying 
levels of the construct being measured [27].  To date, results from tests of these hypotheses explain, at 
best, only a small portion of the Black-White depression paradox.  The prevalence of psychotic spectrum 




disorders more broadly, found between Blacks and Whites.  Tests of differential item functioning have 
detected only minor differences in how the items and symptoms of the diagnostic interview for 
depression function between Blacks and Whites [27, 76].  A fuller discussion of differential item 
functioning tests is taken up below. 
 
To date, explaining the second paradox of discordant Black-White findings between psychiatric 
disorder and distress has received no research attention, to my knowledge.  Nevertheless, the second 
paradox suggests a resolution of the first paradox.  That the distress findings, but not the disorder 
findings, cohere with social stress paradigm predictions, suggests the possibility of a methodological 
flaw in the diagnostic interviews used in the psychiatric epidemiology studies that does not arise in 
measures of distress.  One clear difference between the two types of measures is that although they 
share symptom content, diagnostic measures often employ complex algorithms utilizing screening 
symptoms and exclusion criteria – features generally absent in distress measures -- that create 
additional opportunities for measurement error. Because the Black-White prevalence difference is 
pronounced for major depression, and the distress measures borrow heavily from depression symptoms 
[26, 107], an examination of the major depression diagnostic algorithm is a logical starting point for 
identifying possible artifactual problems among the diagnostic interviews. 
 
Since the introduction of standardized criteria for diagnosing psychiatric disorders in 1980, in 
the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), major depression 
has been formally defined by nine symptoms, and diagnosis requires endorsing at least five.  At least 
one of the five must be either sad mood or a loss of interest or pleasure in most activities (anhedonia), 
hereafter referred to as screening symptoms.  The remaining seven symptoms are poor concentration, 




patterns, low energy, and retarded or agitated movement.  The first five of these nine symptoms have 
been classified as psychological symptoms and the last four as somatic (i.e., physical) symptoms [19].  
Thus, diagnosis entails endorsement of at least one psychological symptom but does not require 
endorsement of a somatic symptom. The introduction of these standardized diagnostic criteria in 1980, 
including the required endorsement of at least one screener, coincides with the advent of the large 
psychiatric epidemiology studies using representative household samples of the US.  The evidence, 
therefore, of a Black-White depression paradox derives entirely from studies employing these diagnostic 
criteria.  
 
Although depression is commonly conceptualized as comprising both psychological and somatic 
factors in approximately equal measure [108–112] – clearly reflected in the DSM’s diagnostic symptoms 
-- the diagnostic algorithm advantages the psychological factor in depression by virtue of the required 
endorsement of a psychological screening symptom.  However, the notion has been present for decades 
that some cultural groups experience and/or express depression more somatically than others [110, 
113–118].  Ryder and colleagues [115] propose a general framework for interpreting somatic 
expressions of depression.  First, some individuals may primarily experience, or be aware of, the somatic 
symptoms of their depression.  Second, some individuals may have awareness of both the psychological 
and somatic symptoms of their depression, but the somatic are more salient to them.  Third, 
somatization may reflect not so much the experience of depression, or the primary experience of it, but 
a response style in clinical or diagnostic interviews.  Regarding the first two, somatization may result 
from culturally influenced mind-body norms, with some cultures making a weaker distinction between 
these realms than is normative in European cultures [114, 119].  From a more Freudian perspective, the 
exclusive experience of somatic symptoms, or their greater salience, may derive from ego defenses 




greater reporting of somatic symptoms may be linked with greater stigma attaching to psychological 
than somatic symptoms [114, 117, 118, 121].  Or, in poor resource settings, cultural norms or the 
conscious choice to selectively report somatic symptoms over psychological symptoms may reflect a 
strategy in which somatic symptoms are more likely than psychological symptoms to secure treatment 
[120]. Importantly, each of these manifestations of somatization would entail, though for different 
reasons, greater reporting of somatic symptoms in diagnostic interviews. 
 
Also a recurring theme in the literature for several decades, often expressed by clinicians, is that 
Blacks in the US experience or express depression more somatically than Whites [78–80, 122].  
Explanations for this alleged difference have included the following: “The denial of natural impulses and 
feeling, forced on blacks by racism, has created in them those symptoms that may not be representative 
of the typical white depressed patient. Instead, neurotic depressions are frequently manifested through 
somatic complaints” (p. 99) [79].  In contrast, Sleath et al [123] found evidence that clinicians may 
interpret the expression of emotions differently between Black and White patients, leading then to 
different psychotropic prescribing practices and suggesting the possibility of biases in clinicians’ race-
based observations. However, one need only consider how cultural differences, stemming from 
contrasting historical experiences, could shape the differential experience and expression of 
psychopathology [124, 125] to posit the possibility of Black-White differences in how depression is 
expressed. 
 
Indeed, potential Black-White differences in how depression is expressed have been tested [27, 
76, 111], with little evidence of greater depression somatization in Blacks than Whites [27, 76].  
However, these findings have limited implications for the Black-White depression paradox.  They rely on 




thereby excluding those whose more somatic expression of depression inhibits endorsing a screener. To 
the extent this latter group is disproportionately Black, all else being equal, depression would be 
disproportionately undercounted in Blacks. 
 
If it were found that groups differed in their expression of depression on a somatic-psychological 
continuum, with some groups expressing depression more somatically and others expressing it more 
psychologically, then the DSM-defined major depression diagnostic algorithm would bias against the 
more somatic group, by virtue of the screening symptoms.   An alternative diagnostic algorithm that is 
less biased against somatic manifestations of depression would forego the required screening symptoms 
and simply require endorsement of any five or more of the nine symptoms, while retaining all other 
elements of the DSM diagnostic algorithm.  If Blacks do in fact express depression more somatically than 
Whites, the screening symptom requirement could lead to a more pronounced underestimate of major 




The foregoing discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
1. Blacks express major depression more somatically than Whites, controlling for somatic 
health; 
2. Blacks are less likely than Whites, controlling for underlying levels of depression, to endorse 
the screening symptoms and greater somatization explains this lower likelihood; 
3. Creating an alternative diagnostic algorithm for major depression by eliminating the 




more prevalent in Blacks than Whites (strong version), or narrows the prevalence gap (weak 
version). 
Control for somatic health when testing the first hypothesis is necessary to rule out the 
alternative explanation that Blacks endorse more somatic symptoms than Whites because of worse 
somatic health.  Although the experience of poor somatic health is a cause of major depression, it could 
also, independent of depression, cause some of the somatic symptoms of depression (e.g., poor sleep or 
fatigue). Control for underlying depression when testing the second hypothesis is necessary to rule out 
the alternative explanation that Blacks are less likely than Whites to endorse the screening symptoms 
simply due to lower levels of depression rather than because of greater somatization. 
A good test of these hypotheses – and better than previous tests of related hypotheses [27, 76, 
111] -- would use data from a diagnostic interview of major depression in which information was 
available on all nine diagnostic symptoms from all participants in a nationally representative US sample. 
This would permit measuring the somatic expression of depression and the alternative diagnostic 
algorithm in a sample whose formation is not contingent on endorsing a psychological screening 
symptom. To my knowledge, the only psychiatric epidemiology study using a representative sample of 
the US population that collected responses on all nine major depression symptoms in the full sample is 










This study’s hypotheses are tested in data from NLAES.  The National Institute of Alcohol Abuse 
and Alcoholism sponsored and designed the study, which was conducted in 1991-1992 using a nationally 
representative household sample of 42,862 English-speaking adults 18 and older in the 48 contiguous 
states and the District of Columbia.  Blacks and persons aged 18-29 were oversampled.  Professional 
non-clinician interviewers from the U.S. Census Bureau conducted face-to-face interviews with 
participants in their homes, using the Alcohol Use Disorders and Associated Disabilities Interview 
Schedule, based on the diagnostic criteria of the fourth edition of the DSM (AUDASIS-IV).  The household 




Race. Those who self-reported being non-Hispanic and Black (unweighted n = 5,955; weighted percent = 
12.84%) or non-Hispanic and White (unweighted n = 31,938; weighted percent = 87.16%) comprise the 
sample for this study. 
 
Age.  Four age groups were created based on self-report and distributed as follows in the weighted 
sample: 18-24: Blacks = 17.3%, Whites = 12.4%; 25-44: Blacks = 48.4%, Whites = 42.9%; 45-64 Blacks = 
17.1%, Whites = 26.6%; ≥ 65: Blacks = 11.7%, Whites = 18.1% (χ
2
 = 320.14, df = 3, p < 0.0001).   Age is 
adjusted for in all analyses because of its appreciably different distribution in Blacks and Whites, 
statistically significant association with screener endorsement (χ
2
 = 719.67, df = 3, p < 0.0001), and 
because it is not a mediator of interest in the relationship between race and mental health. 
 
Sex.  Sex was measured through self-report and is adjusted for in all analyses because of the appreciably 






 = 30.77, df = 1, p < 0.0001), its statistically significant association with screener endorsement 
(χ
2
 = 279.68, df = 1, p < 0.0001), and because, like age, it is not a mediator of interest in the race-mental 
health relationship. 
 
Major depressive episode. The interview for major depressive episode provides all of the data for the 
mental health measures in this study (underlying depression, somatization, screening symptom 
endorsement, and major depressive episode).  Major depressive episode itself is the outcome of the 
third hypothesis and its measurement is described in detail here and the derivative measures (e.g., 
somatization) are described below.  A major depressive episode is a prerequisite for the mutually 
exclusive diagnoses of major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. Individuals satisfying diagnostic 
criteria for both a major depressive episode and a lifetime manic episode are diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder; those meeting criteria for only a major depressive episode receive a major depressive disorder 
diagnosis. Since a large majority of those with a major depressive episode receive a unipolar depression 
diagnosis rather than the bipolar diagnosis [23], and because NLAES did not assess manic episodes, the 
prevalence of major depressive episode serves in this study as a proxy for major depressive disorder. 
The term “major depression” is used throughout to indicate “major depressive disorder,” for which 
major depressive episode serves as a proxy in this study. 
 
 The DSM-IV criteria for a major depressive episode – unevenly applied in NLAES, as will be 
shown below -- are as follows.  Individuals must endorse at least five of the nine depression symptoms, 
at least one of which must be sad mood or anhedonia.  All symptoms must co-occur over at least a two-
week period and occur during most days, for most of the day.  However, putative cases are excluded if 
any of the following sets of exclusion criteria are met: 1) the symptoms are better explained as the 




drugs; 2) the symptoms are better accounted for by bereavement within two months of the loss of a 
loved one, unless the bereavement is also marked by any of the following: pronounced functional 
impairment, psychotic symptoms, psychomotor retardation, suicidal ideation, or morbid preoccupation 
with worthlessness; 3) a lack of clinically significant distress  or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important domains of functioning; and 4) the symptoms occur as part of a mixed episode (i.e., an 
episode with manic features).  
 
Major depressive episode is the only non-substance use psychiatric condition ascertained in 
NLAES.  It was assessed using the AUDASIS-IV.  This is a fully structured interview conducted by trained 
lay interviewers.  Test-retest reliability of the AUDADIS-IV major depression interview has ranged from 
κ=0.65 to κ=0.73 [127–129].  Clinical reappraisal studies of major depressive episode and major 
depressive disorder using the AUDADIS-IV have had agreement in the κ=0.64-0.68 range [130].  Evidence 
from convergent validity studies was also good and is described elsewhere [38, 129, 131, 132]. 
 
Lifetime and 12-month major depressive episodes were measured in separate modules in the 
interview (Figure).   The lifetime module first determines the occurrence of the two screening symptoms 
by asking participants if in their lifetime they have ever experienced a two-week or longer period when 
they 1) felt sad, blue, depressed, or down most of the time, or 2) did not care about or enjoy “the usual 
things.”  The physical illness and bereavement exclusions are enacted by asking if all of these periods 
occurred “when physically ill, getting over being ill, or just after someone close to you died.” When 
participants identified two or more periods not excluded because of illness or bereavement, they were 
asked to identify either their worst (n = 2,573; weighted = 87.3%) or most recent (n = 384; weighted = 
12.7%) episode.  They were next asked about the other seven diagnostic symptoms co-occurring for two 




physical illness or bereavement.  One to four questions were asked to ascertain each of the seven 
symptoms and endorsing any one counted as endorsing the symptom.  The clinical significance exclusion 
criteria was operationalized in two questions asking about concurrent problems getting along with 
others and getting done what needed to be done.  If neither item was endorsed, the case was excluded.   
The medication and substance use and withdrawal exclusion criteria were implemented over a series of 
questions at the end of the lifetime module.  Manic and mixed episode exclusion criteria were not 
operationalized in the NLAES lifetime depression module. 
 
In the past-year module, participants were asked about the occurrence over the past 12 months 
of all nine diagnostic symptoms for depressive episode, regardless of whether or not the screening 
symptoms were endorsed.  As shown in the Figure, all participants are included in this module except 
those whose focal period identified in the lifetime module occurred in the past 12 months (n = 2,451, 
weighted = 6%), which rendered the past-year module redundant.  The same symptom questions are 
implemented in the past-year module as in the lifetime module except that each was prefaced with “At 
any time in the last 12 months.”  Concurrence of symptoms was determined by asking of all those 
endorsing a screening symptom and at least three other symptoms how many periods lasting two weeks 
or longer in the past year they had a screening symptom “and also had some of the other experiences.” 
The physical illness and bereavement exclusions are implemented by next asking all those endorsing 
symptom concurrence in the previous question whether or not all periods in the last 12 months 
occurred “when ill, getting over illness, or after death of someone close.”  Unlike the lifetime module, 
neither the clinical significance nor the medication, alcohol and substance use exclusion criteria were 
implemented in the past-year module.  Like the lifetime module, the manic and mixed episode exclusion 





Together the two modules yield data on all nine major depression symptoms over the past 12 
months from all participants.  From this, the outcome of the third hypothesis – past year major 
depressive episode measured using both the conventional and alternative algorithms -- can be tested in 
an unbiased sample with respect to the somatic expression of depression. 
   
Major depression screening symptom endorsement.  This is a dichotomous variable defined by whether 
or not participants endorsed either sad mood or anhedonia occurring over a two-week or longer period 
in the last 12 months. 
 
Underlying depression.  This factor was captured as a summary score of the seven non-screening 
symptoms endorsed in the major depressive episode interview assessing the last 12 months and has a 
range from 0 to 7. 
 
Somatization.  This construct was operationalized as a difference score between the number of somatic 
symptoms endorsed (range 0 – 4) and the number of psychological symptoms endorsed (range 0 – 3) in 
the major depressive episode interview assessing the last 12 months.  The screening symptoms were 
excluded because they are the dependent variable in the second hypothesis.   Scores can range from -3 
to +4.  Thus, a person endorsing all psychological symptoms and no somatic symptoms would have a 
score of -3 and a person endorsing all four somatic symptoms and no psychological symptoms would 
have a score of +4. 
 
Two-thirds of the weighted sample endorsed no depression symptoms at all, including neither 
screener symptom, and therefore had a somatization score of “0.”  Thus, those providing essentially no 




between somatization and screener endorsement.  Lumping those providing no information with those 
endorsing an equal number of somatic and psychological symptoms (and who therefore also have a 
somatization score of “0”) leads to an artifactual non-linear v-shaped relationship between these 
variables since a large majority of those with a “0” somatization score (i.e., in the approximate middle of 
the score range) also did not endorse a screener.  To minimize these effects, the primary analyses in this 
study are conducted only among those endorsing at least one of the nine depression symptoms (n = 
12,574).  In this smaller sample, everyone provides information on somatization, thereby reducing or 
eliminating artifact from the somatization-screener endorsement relationship.  Secondary sensitivity 
analyses were conducted using the full sample to examine whether the smaller sample used in the 
primary analyses produces noticeably discrepant findings. To account for the non-linear somatization-
screener endorsement relationship caused by those providing no data on depressive symptomatology in 
this secondary analysis, somatization is modeled with five categories as shown in Table S1. The five 
categories were chosen to isolate those with “0” somatization scores (i.e., the middle of the five 
categories) and those at the low and high ends of somatization (i.e., the lowest and highest of the five 
categories). 
  
Somatic illness. This measure was a sum of up to 23 conditions that participants identified as “causing 
problems in the last 12 months.” (Stomach ulcer, enlarged liver, jaundice, cirrhosis of the liver, hepatitis, 
“some other liver disease,” “high blood cholesterol, high blood fat, or high lipid content,” gastritis, 
convulsions or epilepsy, hardening of the arteries or arteriosclerosis, high blood pressure, chest pain or 
angina, rapid heartbeat or tachycardia, heart attack or myocardial infarction, “other heart disease,” 
stroke or cerebrovascular disease, emphysema, “arthritis, osteoporosis or other joint or bone disease,” 
vitamin deficiencies or anemia, pancreatitis or any disease of the pancreas, cancer, and “any other 







All analyses were conducted using SAS software’s (version 9.3, SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC) 
survey procedures to account for NLAES’ survey weights and complex sampling design.  Accordingly, all 
results reported below are weighted to the US population and standard errors account for the multi-
strata sampling plan.  As described in the discussion of the somatization measure above, the primary 
analyses were conducted among those endorsing at least one of the nine depression symptoms in the 
past 12 months and secondary analyses were conducted in the full sample.  All analyses adjust for age 
and sex, either through standardization when means or probabilities are compared, or in multivariable 
logistic regression analyses. Mean differences between Blacks and Whites in somatic health, underlying 
depression, somatization, and underlying dimensions of somatization were tested using SURVEYREG 
procedures which allowed for multivariable adjustments and age- and sex-standardizing (to the White 
distribution of these variables) using the estimate procedure. Significance tests using t-tests of these 
mean and probability comparisons were conducted on openepi.com. 
 
The second hypothesis was tested using the SURVEYLOGISTIC procedure and adjusts for 
underlying depression, age, sex, and somatization.  
 
The third hypothesis entails a Black-White comparison of major depressive episode prevalence 
in the full sample using conventional and alternative diagnostic algorithms. The full sample is used in 
testing this hypothesis because no adjustments are made for somatization.  The SURVEYMEANS 




odds ratios.  These procedures were employed in the weighted unadjusted sample and in the weighted 
age- and sex-adjusted sample. 
 
In the secondary analysis of the first hypothesis, where somatization is modeled as a categorical 
rather than continuous outcome, polytomous regression was employed in the SURVEYLOGISTIC 





 This study examined a methodological explanation for the consistent finding of a lower 
prevalence of major depression in Blacks than Whites.  In the full NLAES sample, adjusting for age and 
sex, Blacks had a lower prevalence of past-year major depressive episode than Whites (Black prevalence 
= 2.03%, White prevalence = 3.63%; t = 4.14, p < 0.0001; OR = 0.60, 95% confidence interval (CI), 0.53 – 
0.67).  Thus, as in the three other psychiatric epidemiology studies using a representative sample of the 
US household population [35, 36, 38], the Black-White depression paradox was present in the NLAES 
sample as well.   Results from testing the three hypotheses are presented below, first from the primary 
sample and then from the secondary sample.  All analyses were based on a sample weighted to reflect 




The first hypothesis was that Blacks express depression more somatically than Whites, adjusting 




means are compared.  Blacks had a statistically significantly higher mean somatization score than Whites, 
which supports the first hypothesis.  Because Blacks and Whites did not differ in their somatic health 
means, which are shown in the second row of results in Table 1, there was no need to adjust for this 
variable when testing the first hypothesis. 
 
Table 1 also shows results of Black-White comparisons on the underlying symptom structure of 
the somatization measure.  Among the four somatic symptoms, Blacks were statistically significantly 
more likely than Whites to endorse weight/appetite change, but Whites were statistically significantly 
more likely than Blacks to endorse low energy.  Among the five psychological symptoms, Whites were 
more likely than Blacks to endorse each, although none of these differences was statistically significant.  
In a composite measure summing probabilities across the four somatic symptoms, there was no 
meaningful difference between Blacks and Whites.  However, in the composite measure of the five 
psychological symptoms, Whites had a statistically significant higher score than Blacks, both when 
excluding and including the screening symptoms.  These results suggest that Blacks’ higher somatization 
scores were driven by the weight/appetite symptom and Whites’ slightly greater tendency to endorse 
psychological symptoms, and not by a greater inclination in Blacks than Whites to endorse somatic 
symptoms generally. 
 
The second hypothesis was that Blacks will have a lower probability than Whites of endorsing a 
screening symptom, adjusting for underlying depression, and that this lower probability is explained by 
greater somatization in Blacks.  The results from logistic regression did not support the hypothesis 
(Table 2, models 1 and 2).   Model 1 shows that Blacks had effectively the same odds as Whites of 
endorsing at least one past-year screening symptom, adjusting for underlying depression, age, and sex.  




after adding somatization to the model.  Logistic regression is typically used only for rare dichotomous 
outcomes (usually defined as a prevalence < 10%), in which case the odds ratio more closely 
approximates the more interpretable risk ratio.  However, odds ratios only run the risk of dramatically 
overstating relative risks when the outcome is common and the effect size of the variable of interest is 
large [133].  In the present analysis, although screener endorsement prevalence exceeds 10 percent, the 
effect size of race on the outcome is small, in which case logistic regression does not meaningfully 
overstate the risk ratio. 
 
The third hypothesis was that applying an alternative diagnostic algorithm that eliminates the 
screener requirement but retains all other diagnostic criteria would either make the Black prevalence of 
major depression higher than the White prevalence (strong version) or narrow the Black-White 
prevalence gap (weak version).  The results from testing this hypothesis supported the weak version and 
are shown in Table 3.   Past-year major depressive episode prevalences were compared in Blacks and 
Whites using the conventional and alternative algorithms in an unstandardized sample in the top panel 
and in an age- and sex-standardized sample in the bottom panel.  The prevalence increased in both 
Blacks and Whites, and in both samples, when applying the alternative algorithm, but the prevalence 
increase was greater in Blacks than in Whites.  This is most clearly seen in the odds ratios shown on the 
right side of Table 3.  In the unstandardized sample, the Black-White odds ratio narrowed from 0.70 
using the conventional algorithm to 0.81 using the unconventional algorithm.  In the standardized 
sample, the odds ratio narrowed from 0.60 to 0.71.  In both samples, the 95 percent confidence 
intervals around these odds ratios stayed well below 1.0. 
 
Curiously, these results appear to be inconsistent with the results from testing the second 




Blacks and Whites in the likelihood of endorsing screening symptoms, adjusting for age, sex, and 
underlying depression, and further adjusting for somatization did not alter this. Accordingly, removing 
the screening symptom requirement from the diagnostic algorithm should have had no effect on the 
Black-White depression odds ratio. That it did have an effect in the third hypothesis results is therefore 
unexpected.  In other words, results from the second hypothesis ruled out screener endorsement as a 
mediator of the race-depression relationship, yet evidence from testing the third hypothesis supported 
mediation.  This apparent contradiction between results is discussed in the Discussion section. 
 
Secondary analysis  
 
Results from the secondary analysis, conducted in the full sample, were generally consistent 
with those from the primary analysis.  As discussed above, the full sample was not used in the primary 
analysis because two-thirds of the full sample endorsed no past-year depression symptoms and 
therefore contributed no information on somatization.  However, to test the robustness of the findings 
from the smaller, primary sample, the same hypotheses were tested in the full sample but with 
somatization modeled categorically in most analyses, for reasons here explained. Table S1 shows how 
somatization scores and frequencies were arrayed across the five somatization categories in this sample, 
ranging from Low (those with somatization scores of -3 and -2) to High (those with somatization scores 
of 2, 3, and 4).  Those with somatization scores of 0 formed by far the largest category and of these, 91 
percent in the weighted sample endorsed no symptoms at all, including neither screening symptom.  
This would induce an artificially steep downward slope in the somatization-screener endorsement 
relationship if somatization were modeled continuously in this sample, since most in the sample would 




endorsing a screener.  By modeling somatization categorically, the anticipated v-shaped relationship 
between somatization and screener endorsement can be captured more precisely.  
 
Results from testing the first hypothesis – that Blacks somatize depression more than Whites, 
adjusting for somatic health -- in the secondary sample are shown in Tables S2 and S3.  As in the primary 
sample, this hypothesis was supported.  Table S2 shows that Blacks had a statistically significantly higher 
mean somatization score than Whites when somatization was modeled continuously (it was modeled 
continuously in Table S2 for descriptive purposes; in Tables S3 and S4 it was modeled categorically).  In 
this sample, the mean number of somatic health conditions was statistically significantly higher in Blacks 
than Whites (Table S2) and therefore the somatization mean scores adjusted for somatic health.  Table 
S3 shows the results of comparing Blacks and Whites on somatization when modeled categorically, 
adjusting for age, sex, and somatic health.  These polytomous regression results modeled the odds of 
being in each of the four higher somatization categories compared to the odds of being in the lowest 
category.  Looking at the race variable, we see that Blacks had statistically significantly higher odds than 
Whites of being in the highest somatization category versus the lowest category.  Blacks also had higher 
odds than Whites of being in the intermediate somatization categories versus the lowest category, but 
none of these differences was statistically significant. 
 
Returning to Table S2 to examine the dimensions underlying somatization when it was 
measured continuously, the results paralleled those from the primary analysis except that none of the 
differences in the secondary analysis was statistically significant.  The absence of statistically significant 
Black-White differences in the full sample on the underlying dimensions of the somatization measure 




symptoms at all and the lack of Black-White differences in these participants statistically overwhelm 
whatever differences arose in the remaining sample. 
 
Results from testing the second hypothesis – that Blacks will have a lower probability of 
endorsing a screening symptom than Whites and this will be explained by somatization -- in the full 
sample (Table S4) mirrored those from the primary sample.  In model 1, Blacks and Whites had the same 
odds of endorsing a screening symptom, adjusting for underlying depression, age, and sex.  Adding 
somatization (modeled categorically) and somatic health to the model (model 2) had no effect on the 
Black-White odds ratio. 
 
Summarizing across the primary and secondary analyses, Blacks had statistically significantly 
higher somatization scores than Whites in both analyses, which supported the first hypothesis.  
However, there was no evidence that this difference constrained Blacks’ likelihood of endorsing a 
screening symptom, a finding that did not support the second hypothesis.  And finally, removing the 
screening symptom requirement from the diagnostic algorithm narrowed, but did not close or reverse, 
the major depression prevalence gap between Blacks and Whites, which supported the weaker version 
of the third hypothesis.  As noted above, the results from testing the second and third hypotheses 





This study tested the idea, frequently found in the literature, that Blacks express depression 




screening symptoms required for a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, which in turn explains their 
lower prevalence of the disorder.  Three hypotheses were tested in data from NLAES.  All analyses 
adjusted for differences in the age and sex distributions between Blacks and Whites, were weighted to 
the US population, and were based on past-year symptom reporting. 
 
Although results supported the hypothesis that Blacks express depression more somatically than 
Whites, the difference was small and is explained by one somatic symptom (weight/appetite change, 
which Blacks had a relatively high probability of endorsing compared with Whites) and a general 
tendency for Whites to endorse psychological symptoms more often than Blacks.  However, results did 
not support the second hypothesis that Blacks would have a lower likelihood than Whites of endorsing a 
screening symptom, adjusting for underlying depression, and somatization would explain this. Blacks 
had the same odds as Whites of endorsing a screening symptom, whether or not somatization was in 
the model.  Thus, there was no evidence that the small Black-White difference on the somatization 
measure suppressed Blacks’ likelihood of endorsing the screening symptoms. 
 
Results were consistent with the weaker version of the third hypothesis that removing the 
required endorsement of a screening symptom from the diagnostic algorithm for major depression, 
while retaining all other features of the algorithm, would attenuate the Blacks-White major depression 
odds ratio.  However, if there was no Black-White difference in the probability of endorsing a screening 
symptom – as shown from testing the second hypothesis -- then removing this factor from the 
diagnostic algorithm should have had no effect on the Black-White odds ratio of depression. A possible 





A preliminary question is why the Black-White difference in somatization had virtually no effect 
on the Black-White odds of endorsing a screener.  One interpretation is that the somatization difference 
itself was small (on a seven-point scale, the absolute difference in mean somatization scores in the 
primary sample was 0.11) and was driven in part by the relatively large magnitude of the Black-White 
difference on the weight/appetite change symptom.  Blacks’ greater likelihood of endorsing this 
symptom may be only weakly related to sad mood or distress. For example, incidence of 
weight/appetite change may be due to somatic health conditions, weight loss regimens, or distress, but 
not depression.  
 
Regarding the apparently inconsistent results from testing the second and third hypotheses, an 
explanation seems to lie with how the alternative diagnostic algorithm was operationalized in the past-
year module of the NLAES. In the past-year module, the physical illness/bereavement exclusion question 
was asked only of those endorsing a screening symptom and three or more co-occurring additional 
depression symptoms.  Therefore, those not endorsing a screening symptom but endorsing five or more 
other depression symptoms (and therefore satisfying the more lenient criterion of the alternative 
algorithm) were not asked the physical illness/bereavement exclusion question. Said differently, 
participants endorsing a screening symptom had the opportunity to be excluded from a diagnosis by 
also endorsing co-occurring physical illness or bereavement whereas those not endorsing a screening 
symptom did not have this opportunity.  To the extent that Blacks were more likely than Whites to 
endorse this exclusion, then removing this exclusion from the diagnostic algorithm would have 
augmented the Black prevalence of depression more than the White prevalence when testing the 





 A post-hoc analysis to investigate this possibility was conducted in the weighted, age- and sex-
standardized sample.  Among those asked the physical illness/bereavement exclusion question in the 
past-year module (i.e., among those who endorsed a screener and three or more co-occurring additional 
depression symptoms), 58 percent of Blacks compared with 40 percent of Whites endorsed the 
exclusion.  If these proportions are applied to those who were not subject to this exclusion question in 
the past-year module but who would have been subject to it in a properly operationalized alternative 
algorithm (i.e., among those who endorsed five or more past-year symptoms, none of which was sad 
mood or anhedonia), the past-year prevalence of major depressive episode using the alternative 
algorithm reduces from 3.49 percent to 2.94 percent in Blacks and from 4.25 percent to 4.00 percent in 
Whites, which produces a revised odds ratio of 0.73.  This revised odds ratio is close to the OR of 0.70 
generated from the conventional algorithm.  Thus, had the alternative algorithm been operationalized 
so that the only difference between it and the conventional algorithm was elimination of the screening 
symptom criteria, the Black-White odds ratios of the two algorithms would have been more or less the 
same.  In short, the inconsistent second and third hypotheses results appear to largely be an artifact of 
how the alternative algorithm was necessarily, though imperfectly, implemented in the NLAES interview. 
 
The broader question this post-hoc analysis poses is how to interpret the Black-White difference 
in the proportions endorsing the physical illness/bereavement exclusion among those asked this 
question.  To the extent this Black-White difference obtains in diagnostic interviews for depression 
generally, and more specifically in the psychiatric epidemiology studies that reveal a Black-White 
depression paradox, the question is whether or not this difference reflects illness and bereavement 
exclusions that are legitimate applications of the DSM criteria.  If it does, and no other sources of bias 
exist, then along with the other findings from this study, it suggests that the Black-White depression 




rather than from symptom endorsement patterns.  On the other hand, depression is misclassified if 
these two exclusion criteria are poorly operationalized, or if participants give invalid answers (i.e., by 
under- or over-reporting illness or bereavement). If depression misclassification stemming from the 
exclusion criteria is non-differential between Blacks and Whites, depression prevalence is either under-
counted in both groups (because too many are excluded) or over-counted in both groups (because too 
few are excluded). Alternatively, if misclassification stemming from the exclusion criteria is differential 
by race, multiple possibilities exist depending on whether misclassification exists in one group or both, 
and in which direction(s) it occurs. 
 
It is clear that the NLAES misclassified depressive episodes due to the study’s broad 
operationalization of the physical illness/bereavement exclusion criteria.  In the DSM, the medical 
condition and bereavement exclusions are designed to rule out, respectively, depressive episodes 
directly physiologically caused by a medical condition such as hypothyroidism, and those occurring 
within two months after the loss of a loved one.  These criteria are operationalized far more broadly in 
the NLAES than the DSM conceptualizations warrant.  The NLAES asks whether the depressive 
symptoms co-occurred “when physically ill, getting over being ill, or just after someone close to you 
died.” This NLAES operationalization of the medical condition criteria makes no distinction between 
somatic conditions that can directly physiologically cause depressive symptoms (cases that should be 
excluded, according to the DSM) and somatic conditions that are etiologically independent of 
depression or that cause depression through a psychological mechanism such as the meaning a person 
makes of a somatic illness limiting their mobility (cases that should be included, according to the DSM).  
As the medical condition criterion is operationalized in the NLAES, these distinctions cannot be made 
and some participants will invalidly (per the DSM criteria specifications, rather than the NLAES 




pertains to the bereavement exclusion.  The NLAES expression “just after someone died” under-specifies 
the DSM two-month cut-off and it is likely that participants variously interpreted this to imply a cut-off 
shorter or longer than two months.  It is impossible to know how each of these scenarios actually 
impacted endorsement patterns in the NLAES, and how they may have differed by race. 
 
Given the opportunities for misclassification due to the NLAES’ operationalization of the physical 
illness/bereavement exclusion criteria, and given that misclassification patterns in Blacks and Whites in 
the NLAES based on these criteria is unknowable, no conclusions can be drawn about the legitimacy of 
the Black-White differential on endorsing these exclusion criteria.  What is certain, however, is that in 
the NLAES sample, Black-White differences on symptom endorsements were nowhere near the scale of 
the Black-White difference on endorsing the physical illness/bereavement exclusion criteria.  Moreover, 
it appears from the ad hoc analysis described above, that these exclusion criteria were nearly sufficient 
to explain the overall prevalence difference in major depressive episode between the two groups in this 
sample. 
 
Left unexplored in the present analysis was how the clinical significance and medication/ 
substance use exclusion criteria further shaped and ultimately determined the Black-White depression 
prevalence ratio in the NLAES sample.  However, prior evidence indicates that few cases are excluded 
through these criteria [23, 37, 129]. Future studies should explore in this and other data sets which 
criteria in the depression algorithm most strongly determine the lower prevalence of major depression 
in Blacks than Whites. These detailed analyses could ultimately highlight more specifically where 
methodological problems with the depression interview may lay, or where protective and/or harmful 
factors might have their biggest impact in shaping the estimates of major depression prevalence in 





Thus, methodological explanations for the Black-White depression paradox remain to be 
developed and tested.  The evidence presented here does not support the idea of a meaningful 
difference between Blacks and Whites on depression somatization; the small difference found did not 
account for any potential under-endorsement of the depression screening symptoms in Blacks. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
 
The primary strength of this study is that it relied on a large sample in which all participants 
provided information on all past-year depression symptoms. NLAES is the only large psychiatric 
epidemiology study using a nationally representative US sample in which all participants were asked 
about all nine depression symptoms, regardless of screener endorsement.  This permitted an 
assessment of depression somatization in a sample that was unbiased by conditioning on endorsement 
of a psychological screening symptom.   
 
Several limitations of this study are noted as well.  First, the structure of the past-year 
depression module in NLAES led to a sub-optimal test of alternative algorithm.   Nevertheless, a post-
hoc analysis provided an estimate of the effect this may have had on Black and White depression 
prevalences using the alternative algorithm.  Second, depression symptomatology may have been 
inaccurately reported, leading to misclassification at the symptom and diagnostic levels.  To the extent 
this misclassification was differential by race, estimates of somatization, underlying depression, and 
major depressive episode prevalence may be under- or over-estimated in each race group. Third, the 
measure of somatic health relied on participants identifying conditions causing problems in the past 




in the US have worse access to health care and receive poorer care [92, 134–138] than Whites.  This may 
have led to greater underestimation of poor somatic health in Blacks than Whites.  In turn, this would 
invalidly inflate Blacks’ somatization score more than Whites’ score, whether somatic health is adjusted 
for or not, since some of the effect of the unreported poor somatic health is absorbed by the 
somatization score.  Finally, in the NLAES sample, Blacks did not have statistically significantly worse 
somatic health than Whites, as this variable was measured in the study.  This is inconsistent with the 
large body of research documenting that Blacks have worse somatic health than Whites in the US [92, 
139–141].  It could be due to disproportionate, though inadvertent, under-reporting of somatic 
conditions in Blacks, as just discussed, or to the limited number of somatic conditions measured, or to 
random chance in the sample.   The first two reasons have the same implications for the findings: Blacks’ 
somatization score would be biased upward more than Whites’ score.  However, since there was no 
evidence that the small Black-White difference on somatization, as measured, suppressed Blacks’ 
endorsement of screening symptoms, this possible inflation of Blacks’ somatization score would have no 
impact on my conclusions.  On the other hand, if the somatic health of Blacks in this sample was better, 
by chance, than the somatic health of adult Blacks living in households nationwide, it is not clear that 
this would have impacted the conclusions.  Black somatization scores may have been higher in a more 
representative Black sample, in terms of somatic health, but adjusting for somatic health ostensibly 




 In this study, no evidence was found for a meaningful difference between Blacks and Whites on 
the somatization of depression.  Blacks’ slightly higher somatization score was driven by one somatic 




slightly higher level than Whites of depression somatization had no impact on Blacks’ likelihood of 
endorsing a screening symptom.  On the other hand, a large difference was found between Blacks and 
Whites on the likelihood of endorsing the physical illness and bereavement exclusion criteria.  This 
difference accounted for virtually all of the lower prevalence of major depression in Blacks than Whites.  
Future studies should conduct detailed analyses in this and other data sets of where in the diagnostic 
interview for depression the Black-White prevalence gap arises.  Importantly, these analyses should be 
guided by theory regarding group differences.  Such theory will make the researchers’ assumptions 





























Table 1.  Blacks' and Whites' age- and sex-standardized means and prevalences among those endorsing at least one past-year depression symptom 
in the National Longitudinal Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey (1991-1992) 
      
      
  Black White   
    2,122 (13.64%)
1
 10,452 (86.36%) t value p value 
Somatization mean (SE), range -3 to +4
 
  0.65 (0.04) 0.54 (0.02) -2.70 0.01 
Somatic health conditions mean (SE), range 0-22  1.06 (0.04) 1.02 (0.02) -0.81 0.42 
Underlying depression mean (SE), range 1-7  2.52 (0.05) 2.57 (0.03) 0.69 0.49 
      
Underlying dimensions of somatization and depression      
Somatic symptom endorsement probabilities, range 0-1 (SE)      
Weight/appetite change  0.55 (0.01) 0.45 (0.01) -4.41 <0.0001 
Sleep problems  0.41 (0.01) 0.43 (0.01) 0.88 0.38 
Psychomotor changes  0.25 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) -0.44 0.66 
Low energy  0.37 (0.01) 0.42 (0.01) 2.21 0.03 
Psychological symptom endoresement probabilities, range 0-1 (SE)      
Sad mood  0.34 (0.01) 0.36 (0.01) 0.88 0.38 
Anhedonia  0.26 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01) 1.32 0.19 
Poor concentration  0.31 (0.01) 0.32 (0.01) 0.44 0.66 
Guilt/worthlessness  0.23 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 1.77 0.08 
Suicidality  0.39 (0.02) 0.43 (0.01) 1.77 0.08 
Somatic symptom probability sums, range 0-4 (SE)  1.59 (0.04) 1.55 (0.02) -0.84 0.40 
Psychological symptom probability sums, range 0-3 (SE) 
2
  0.93 (0.03) 1.02 (0.01) 3.46 < 0.001 
Psychological symptom probability sums, range 0-5 (SE)
3
  1.53 (0.05) 1.66 (0.02) 2.61 0.01 
      
Note. All comparisons are based on weighted sample.      
1
 unweighted n (weighted %)      
2
 excluding screener symptoms      
3






Table 2.  Logistic regression of race predicting screener endorsement, adjusting for underlying depression, age, sex, 
and somatization, among those endorsing at least one past-year depression symptom in the National Longitudinal 
Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey (1991-1992) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
    OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI 
Race (ref = White)  0.97 0.89 - 1.07  1.00 0.91 - 1.09 
Underlying depression  2.12 2.07 - 2.18  2.15 2.10 - 2.21 
Age  0.82 0.79 - 0.86  0.83 0.79 - 0.86 
Sex (ref = male)  1.06 0.98 - 1.15  1.12 1.03 - 1.21 
Somatization     0.78 0.76 - 0.80 
       
Note. Both analyses based on weighted 








Table 3.  Prevalence of major depressive episode using conventional and unconventional algorithms in the 
National Longitudinal Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey (1991-1992) 
       







(87.16%) t value p value OR 95% CI 
Unstandardized       
conventional algorithm
2
 2.55 (0.00) 3.63 (0.00) -3.30 0.001 0.70 0.62 - 0.78 
alternative algorithm
3
 3.49 (0.00) 4.25 (0.00) -2.04 0.04 0.81 0.74 - 0.89 
       
Standardized
4
       
conventional algorithm 2.03 (0.00) 3.63 (0.00) -4.14 <0.0001 0.60 0.53 - 0.67 
alternative algorithm 2.98 (0.00) 4.25 (0.00) -2.91 0.004 0.71 0.65 - 0.79 
        
Note. All analyses used weighted sample.     
1
 unweighted n (weighted %)       
2
 applying the DSM algorithm as implemented in NLAES     
3
 applying the DSM algorithm as implemented in NLAES, except the requirement of endorsing a screening symptom 
4







Table S1.  Somatization categories in the full sample, age- 
and sex-standardized, in the National Longitudinal 
Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey (1991-1992) 







Low -3, -2  326 (0.9)  
Medium low -1  2,532 (6.6)  
Medium 0  27,622 (73.9)  
Medium high 1  4,966 (12.7)  
High 2, 3, 4  2,447 (6.0)  
   
1







Table S2.  Blacks' and Whites' age-and sex-standardized means and prevalences in the full sample in the National Longitudinal Alcohol 
Epidemiologic Survey (1991-1992) 
      
  Black White   
    5,955 (12.84%)
1
 31,938 (87.16%) t value p value 
Somatization mean (SE), range -3 to +4
 2
  0.15 (0.02) 0.11 (0.01) -2.48 0.01 
Somatic health conditions mean (SE), range 0-22  0.73 (0.03) 0.66 (0.01) -2.08 0.04 
Underlying depression mean (SE), range 1-7  0.84 (0.04) 0.83 (0.02) -0.21 0.84 
      
Underlying dimensions of somatization and depression      
Somatic symptom endorsement probabilities, range 0-1 (SE)      
Weight/appetite change  0.18 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01) -1.32 0.19 
Sleep problems  0.14 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.23 0.81 
Psychomotor changes  0.09 (0.01) 0.08 (0.00) -0.90 0.37 
Low energy  0.13 (0.01) 0.14 (0.00) 0.95 0.34 
Psychological symptom endoresement probabilities, range 0-1 (SE)      
Sad mood  0.11 (0.01) 0.12 (0.00) 0.12 0.91 
Anhedonia  0.09 (0.01) 0.09 (0.00) 0.62 0.53 
Poor concentration  0.11 (0.01) 0.10 (0.00) -0.28 0.78 
Guilt/worthlessness  0.08 (0.01) 0.09 (0.00) 1.60 0.11 
Suicidality  0.13 (0.01) 0.14 (0.00) 0.71 0.48 
Somatic symptom probability sums, range 0-4 (SE)  0.53 (0.03) 0.50 (0.02) -0.89 0.38 
Psychological symptom probability sums, range 0-3 (SE)
3
  0.31 (0.02) 0.33 (0.01) 0.71 0.48 
Psychological symptom probability sums, range 0-5 (SE)
4
  0.51 (0.03) 0.54 (0.02) 0.60 0.55 
      
Note. All comparisons are based on weighted sample.      
1
 unweighted n (weighted %)      
2
 adjusting for somatic health      
3
 excluding screener symptoms      
4









Table S3.  Polytomous regression of somatization on race, adjusting for underlying 
depression, age, sex, and somatic health in the full sample, in the National Longitudinal 
Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey (1991-1992) 
    
  Somatization (ref = low)
1
 OR 95% CI 
Race (ref = White) medium low 1.11 0.89 - 1.38 
 medium 1.14 0.93 - 1.40 
 medium high 1.13 0.92 - 1.39 
 high  1.40 1.11 - 1.76 
    
Age medium low 1.24 1.09 - 1.40 
 medium 1.61 1.42 - 1.83 
 medium high 1.17 1.03 - 1.32 
 high  1.14 0.99 - 1.30 
    
Sex (ref = Male) medium low 1.30 1.07 - 1.56 
 medium 1.28 1.05 - 1.55 
 medium high 1.65 1.35 - 2.01 
 high  2.10 1.69 - 2.60 
    
Somatic health medium low 0.87 0.79 - 0.95 
 medium 0.70 0.65 - 0.77 
 medium high 1.01 0.92 - 1.10 
 high  1.12 1.02 - 1.22 
    
Note. Analysis used weighted sample.   
1
  Somatization scores in each category are: "low" (ref) (-2 and -3); "medium low" (-1); 
"medium" (0; which includes all those endorsing none of the seven symptoms);  "medium 





Table S4.  Logistic regression of depression screener endorsement on race, adjusting for underlying depression, 
age, sex, somatization, and somatic health in the full sample, in the National Longitudinal Alcohol Epidemiologic 
Survey (1991-1992) 
       
  Model 1  Model 2 
    OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI 
Race (ref = White)  0.99 0.89 - 1.10  1.01 0.91 -1.11 
Underlying depression  3.14 3.06 - 3.22  3.11 3.02 - 3.20 
Age                                   0.80 0.76 - 0.83  0.81 0.77 - 0.85 
Sex (ref = male)  1.07 0.99 - 1.17  1.12 1.03 - 1.22 
Somatization (ref = low)                         medium low     0.53 0.43 - 0.65 
medium     0.23 0.18 - 0.29 
medium high     0.27 0.22 - 0.34 
high     0.21 0.17 - 0.27 
Somatic health     0.99 0.95 - 1.04 
       





Chapter 4: Testing a methodological explanation for the paradoxical Black-White findings on 





 An unsolved conundrum consistently appears in large, population-based studies measuring 
mental health in the US: Blacks are reliably shown to have a lower prevalence than Whites of most 
psychiatric disorders [32, 36, 83, 84], yet equal and higher levels of psychological distress [1].  These 
findings suggest a non-trivial double paradox. 
 
 The first paradox is that the Black-White disorder findings contradict the predictions of the 
social stress paradigm, the dominant framework for understanding the relationship between social 
position and mental health [7–11].  Whether acknowledged explicitly [4] or more tacitly [2, 16, 27], this 
paradigm widely governs our expectations of how social status is related to mental health.  The 
paradigm posits that disadvantaged social groups will have worse mental health outcomes 
than more advantaged groups because of greater stressor exposure and diminished access to coping 
resources [4, 87–91].  Black-White comparisons are a strong test [15] of this prediction in the American 
context given Blacks’ disadvantaged social, political, and economic status vis-à-vis Whites, both 
historically and in the present [12–14, 92].  From the framework of the social stress paradigm it is 
therefore paradoxical that the US psychiatric epidemiology studies using nationally representative 
household samples produce consistent results of a lower prevalence of any psychiatric disorder in Blacks 
than Whites [36, 84], and of most individual disorders as well [32, 36, 83, 84].  This finding is relatively 





The second paradox is the discordant Black-White disorder and distress findings in Black-White 
comparisons.  Psychiatric disorder and psychological distress are overlapping, though distinct constructs.  
Both constructs define aversive mental states, are frequently measured with similar symptoms, and are 
phenomenologically related [18–21].  However, a distinction is often made that disorder represents 
dysfunction in the individual whereas distress does not assume such internal dysfunction but more often 
indicates the presence of stressors in the individual’s environment to which the expectable response is 
distress [22, 23].   The constructs can be causally related when, for example, internal mental 
dysfunctions give rise to psychological distress or when chronic distress arising from chronic stressor 
exposure makes a person more vulnerable to developing internal mental dysfunctions [23].  Because of 
these links, we expect that those with a psychiatric disorder would score higher on distress measures 
than those without a disorder, and that those scoring higher on distress measures would be more likely 
to have a psychological disorder than those scoring lower.  In fact, empirical evidence documents these 
associations between depression and distress [24–26].   These findings suggest that in between-group 
comparisons, the group with a higher prevalence of disorder should also have a higher level of distress.  
The apparent lack of such concordance in Black-White comparisons in the US thus constitutes the 
second paradox. 
 
Resolving these paradoxes matters for two reasons.  First, the Black-White disorder findings 
undermine our common and often tacit reliance on the social stress paradigm to predict and understand 
how social position relates to mental health.  When a strong test fails to support the paradigm, its 
credibility is potentially diminished.  Second, the disorder-distress discordance in Black-White 
comparisons likewise potentially undermines how we conceptualize and measure perhaps the two most 





The present study focuses on the second paradox. To date, explaining the second paradox of 
discordant Black-White findings between psychiatric disorder and distress has received no research 
attention, to my knowledge.  Nevertheless, the second paradox suggests a resolution of the first 
paradox.  That the distress findings, but not the disorder findings, cohere with social stress paradigm 
predictions, suggests the possibility of a methodological flaw in the diagnostic interviews used in the 
psychiatric epidemiology studies that does not arise in measures of distress.  One clear difference 
between the two types of measures is that although they share symptom content, diagnostic measures 
often employ complex algorithms utilizing screening symptoms and exclusion criteria – features 
generally absent in distress measures -- that create additional opportunities for measurement error. 
Because the Black-White prevalence difference is pronounced for major depression, and the distress 
measures borrow heavily from depression symptoms [26, 107], an examination of the major depression 
diagnostic algorithm is a logical starting point for identifying possible artifactual problems among the 
diagnostic interviews. 
 
Since the introduction of standardized criteria for diagnosing psychiatric disorders in 1980, in 
the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), major depression has been formally 
defined by nine symptoms, with diagnosis requiring endorsement of at least five.  At least one of the five 
must be either sad mood or a loss of interest or pleasure in most activities (anhedonia), hereafter 
referred to as screening symptoms.  The remaining seven symptoms are poor concentration, feelings of 
worthlessness or excessive guilt, suicidality, appetite/weight change, a change in sleep patterns, low 
energy, and retarded or agitated movement.  The first five of these nine symptoms have been classified 
as psychological symptoms and the last four as somatic (i.e., physical) symptoms [19].  Thus, diagnosis 




somatic symptom. The introduction of these standardized diagnostic criteria in 1980, including the 
required endorsement of at least one screener, coincides with the advent of the large psychiatric 
epidemiology studies using representative household samples of the US.  The evidence, therefore, of a 
Black-White depression paradox derives entirely from studies employing these diagnostic criteria. 
 
Although depression is commonly conceptualized as comprising both psychological and somatic 
factors in approximately equal measure [108–112] – clearly reflected in the DSM’s diagnostic symptoms 
-- the diagnostic algorithm advantages the psychological factor in depression by virtue of the required 
endorsement of a psychological screening symptom.  However, the notion has been present for decades 
that some cultural groups experience and/or express depression more somatically than others [110, 
113–118].  Ryder and colleagues [115] propose a general framework for interpreting somatic 
expressions of depression.  First, some individuals may primarily experience, or be aware of, the somatic 
symptoms of their depression.  Second, some individuals may have awareness of both the psychological 
and somatic symptoms of their depression, but the somatic are more salient to them.  Third, 
somatization may reflect not so much the experience of depression, or the primary experience of it, but 
a response style in clinical or diagnostic interviews.  Regarding the first two, somatization may result 
from culturally influenced mind-body norms, with some cultures making a weaker distinction between 
these realms than is normative in European cultures [114, 119].  From a more Freudian perspective, the 
exclusive experience of somatic symptoms, or their greater salience, may derive from ego defenses 
against unwanted and threatening psychological symptoms [116, 120] With respect to response styles, 
greater reporting of somatic symptoms may be linked with greater stigma attaching to psychological 
than somatic symptoms [114, 117, 118, 121].  Or, in poor resource settings, cultural norms or the 
conscious choice to selectively report somatic symptoms over psychological symptoms may reflect a 




[120]. Importantly, each of these manifestations of somatization would entail, though for different 
reasons, greater reporting of somatic symptoms in diagnostic interviews. 
 
Also a recurring theme in the literature for several decades, often expressed by clinicians, is that 
Blacks in the US experience or express depression more somatically than Whites [78–80, 122].  
Explanations for this alleged difference have included the following: “The denial of natural impulses and 
feeling, forced on blacks by racism, has created in them those symptoms that may not be representative 
of the typical white depressed patient. Instead, neurotic depressions are frequently manifested through 
somatic complaints” (p. 99) [79].  In contrast, Sleath et al [123] found evidence that clinicians may 
interpret the expression of emotions differently between Black and White patients, leading then to 
different psychotropic prescribing practices and suggesting the possibility of biases in clinicians’ race-
based observations. However, one need only consider how cultural differences, stemming from 
contrasting historical experiences, could shape the differential experience and expression of 
psychopathology [124, 125] to posit the possibility of Black-White differences in how depression is 
expressed. 
 
The relevance to the second paradox of a Black-White difference on the somatic dimension of 
depression is that the diagnostic algorithm for depression potentially biases against somatic expressions 
of distress in a way that measures of distress do not.  Whereas a major depression diagnosis requires 
endorsing a psychological screening symptom, no such algorithm exists for measures of distress where 
all items are typically given equal weight.  Thus, to the extent Blacks do somatize depression and other 
forms of distress more than Whites, measures of distress that sufficiently tap somatic symptoms will 





  Some evidence exists of greater distress and depression somatization in Blacks than Whites [27, 
76, 77, 111, 142, 143], but it tends to be symptom- or item-specific, the symptoms vary across studies, 
and to date there is scant evidence to support a broad somatization hypothesis that Blacks endorse a 
spectrum of somatic symptoms more than Whites after adjusting for underlying levels of distress or 
depression.  However, these findings have two main limitations.  First, to my knowledge, no study has 
compared Blacks and Whites on distress and depression in the same sample with the goal of 
understanding discordant results across outcomes.  Second, the studies testing differential item 
functioning between Blacks and Whites on depression symptoms were all conducted in samples in 
which participants screened into the full depression interview because they endorsed at least one 
screening symptom, thereby biasing the sample against those whose more somatic expressions of 
depression may have inhibited endorsement of a screening symptom. Differential item functioning 
occurs when two or more groups of interest have different probabilities of endorsing items or symptoms 
on a measure after controlling for underlying levels of the construct of interest.  Groups may differ in 
their probabilities of endorsing a particular item in a measure, but this could be due to overall lower 
scores on the measure; differential item functioning tests forestall this explanation by adjusting for 
underlying levels of the measure.  The present study circumvents these limitations, first, by comparing 
Blacks and Whites on both distress and depression in the same sample, and second, by assessing 
somatization using the distress measure which all participants completed (and which thereby provides a 




The current study examines whether Blacks express distress more somatically than Whites and 




distress, because of greater distress somatization.  The following specific hypotheses are tested: 
 
1. Blacks will somatize the expression of distress more than Whites, adjusting for somatic 
health. 
2. Blacks will have a lower likelihood than Whites of endorsing a screening symptom, adjusting 
for distress, and this will be partly (weak version) or fully (strong version) explained by 
Blacks’ greater somatization. 
 
Control for somatic health when testing the first hypothesis is necessary to rule out the 
alternative explanation that Blacks endorse more somatic symptoms than Whites because of worse 
somatic health.  Although the experience of poor somatic health is a cause of major depression, it could 








These hypotheses are tested in data from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R).  
This survey was conducted between 2001 and 2003 in a nationally representative sample of English-
speaking civilians 18 and older living in non-institutionalized settings, and students living in campus 
housing who had permanent household addresses, in the 48 contiguous states.  It was one of three 




and Social Research, and collectively called the Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiology Surveys [144].  
The NCS-R response rate was 73.0 percent [145].  Professional non-clinician interviewers conducted 
face-to-face interviews with 9,282 participants using laptop computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) 
methods.  The interview was conducted in two parts during the same appointment.  Part 1 consisted 
primarily of psychiatric diagnostic interviews and part 2 collected data on risk factors for disorder and a 
subset of psychiatric disorders not diagnosed in part 1 [32].  Part 2 was conducted among all those 
diagnosed in Part 1 with a lifetime disorder and a random selection of the remaining Part 1 participants 
[145].  The part 2 sample size was 5,692.  The present study draws only on participants from the part 2 
sample because the distress measure was administered only to them.  The part 1 sample was weighted 
to account for differential probabilities of selection into the study and to match the US population in 
2000 on socio-demographic and geographic factors.  The part 2 sample was weighted to adjust for these 
same factors as well as differential probabilities of selection from part 1 of the study [146].  Psychiatric 
diagnoses were made in the NCS-R using the World Mental Health Survey Initiative Version of the World 
Health Organization’s Composite International Diagnostic Interview (WMH-CIDI), a fully structured, lay-
administered instrument based on DSM-IV criteria [145].  The WMH-CIDI was used in the NCS-R to 
diagnose eight different anxiety disorders, four mood disorders (including major depressive disorder), 




Race. The study sample was comprised of part 2 participants who self-reported being non-Hispanic and 
Black (unweighted n = 717; weighted percent = 14.53%) or non-Hispanic and White (unweighted n = 





Age.  Four age groups were created based on self-report and distributed as follows in the weighted 
sample: 18-24: Blacks = 20.0%, Whites = 12.7%; 25-44: Blacks = 40.2%, Whites = 34.5%; 45-64 Blacks = 
28.2%, Whites = 33.4%; ≥ 65: Blacks = 11.7%, Whites = 19.5% (χ
2
 = 53.39, df = 3, p < 0.0001).   Age is 
adjusted for in all analyses because of its appreciably different distribution in Blacks and Whites, its 
statistically significant association with screener endorsement (χ
2
 = 59.01, df = 3, p < 0.0001), and 
because it is not a mediator of interest in the relationship between race and mental health. 
 
Sex.  Sex was measured through self-report and is adjusted for in all analyses because of the appreciably 
different sex distributions in the weighted Black and White samples (Black female = 57.7%; White female 
= 52.5%; χ
2
 = 6.71, df = 1, p = 0.01), its statistically significant association with screener endorsement (χ
2
 
= 17.43, df = 1, p < 0.0001), and because, like age, it is not a mediator of interest in the race-mental 
health relationship. 
 
Major depression screening symptom endorsement. This is a dichotomous variable derived from the 
major depression interview and defined by whether or not participants endorsed either sad mood or 
anhedonia occurring over a two-week or longer period in the last 12 months.  The major depression 
interview is a component of the WMH-CIDI diagnostic interview and was administered to all part 1 
participants. A blind clinical re-appraisal study comparing NCS-R CIDI past-year major depressive episode 
diagnoses with Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID) major depressive episode diagnoses 
produced a Kappa of .40 (95% Confidence Interval (CI), 0.20 - 0.60) [145].  In the National Survey of 
American Life, conducted simultaneously with the NCS-R, the same comparison yielded Kappas of 0.43 
(95% CI, 0.26 – 0.59) in African-Americans and 0.27 (-0.13 – 0.67) in Whites [67].  These are considered 





Participants skipped out of the past-year depression module if they had previously indicated in 
the interview that they had never in their lifetime experienced a screening symptom lasting two weeks 
or longer, for at least one hour each day, while concurrently experiencing at least one additional, non-
screen symptom nearly every day during the two-week or longer period.  Everyone not skipping out was 
asked at the outset of the past-year depression module: “Did you have an episode of being 
(sad/or/discouraged/or/uninterested) [a participant’s prior responses indicated which of these terms to 
use] with some of the other problems (IF R[espondent] CAN READ: you mentioned on pages 4-5/IF R 
CANNOT READ: we just reviewed) lasting two weeks or longer at any time in the past 12 months?”  
Those endorsing this were counted as a “yes” (n = 700; weighted percent = 8.8%). Those responding “no,” 
and those not asked the question because of previous skip-outs were counted as a “no” (n = 4,197; 
weighted percent = 91.2%).  “The other problems” mentioned in the question refers to the seven non-
screen depression symptoms. 
 
Psychological distress.  The NCS-R used the K10 instrument to measure non-specific psychological 
distress.  It is a widely used, and perhaps the preeminent [19], measure of distress, originally developed 
as a brief screen for serious mental illness in the US National Health Interview Survey and designed to 
maximize sensitivity at the more severe range of psychiatric disorder [20].  As implemented in the NCS-R, 
the K10 asked participants to consider the month in the last year when they were at their worst 
“emotionally, in terms of being anxious, depressed, or emotionally stressed.”  Participants were then 
asked the extent to which they experienced 10 symptoms during the focal month.  Response options for 
each item are “all of the time,” “most of the time,” “some of the time,” “little of the time,” and “none of 
the time,” and were scored from 1 to 5, respectively.  For the present study, responses were reverse 
coded and anchored at 0 so that higher scores indicated higher distress levels.  Scores are summed 




distress symptoms are: “tired for no reason,” “felt nervous,” “felt so nervous nothing could calm you 
down,” “felt hopeless,” “was restless/fidgety,” “was so restless you couldn’t sit still,” “felt depressed,” 
“felt so depressed nothing could cheer you up,” “felt everything was an effort,” and “felt worthless.” 
The third, sixth, and eighth of these questions were asked only of those endorsing the prior item. 
 
In initial validity studies in a general population sample, using 12-month major depression 
diagnoses from the Structured Clinical Interview DSM-IV (SCID) to establish caseness, the area under the 
receiver operator characteristic curve for the K10 was 0.88 [20].  The area under the curve signifies the 
probability that a randomly selected case will have a higher score on the instrument in question than a 
randomly chosen non-case [20]. The area under the curve was 0.96 in discriminating severe from non-
severe cases of major depression [20].  In a nationally representative household survey in Australia, the 
K10’s area under the curve was 0.90 (95% CI, 0.89 – 0.91) when differentiating 12-month cases of any 
mood or anxiety disorder from non-cases determined by the World Health Organization’s CIDI 
employing DSM-IV criteria [147].  In a nationally representative household survey in Canada, the area 
under the curve was 0.93 (95% CI, 0.91 – 0.95) for detecting past-month and 0.87 (95% CI, 0.85 – 0.88) 
for past-year cases of major depressive disorder diagnosed using the WMH-CIDI [107].  The lower area 
under the curve for past-year cases in the Canadian sample can be attributed in part to the fact that the 
K10 stem question employed in that study asks about the last month rather than the worst month of the 
past year.  In a nationally representative household survey in South Africa, when comparing the K10 
inquiring about the last month with any past-year mood or anxiety disorder diagnosed using the WHO-
CIDI, the overall area under the curve was 0.73, and 0.71 for major depressive disorder specifically.  In 
Blacks (76% of the sample), the area under the curve was 0.71 for any past-year mood or anxiety 
disorder, compared with 0.78 in the remaining sample (comprised of those of mixed race, Whites, and 





Somatization.  The somatization measure employed in the present study is a difference score between 
the somatic and psychological symptoms endorsed in the K10.  Thus, the K10 is treated as a measure 
with two factors, somatic and psychological, in which scores are summed for each factor and the 
psychological sum is subtracted from the somatic sum to generate a somatization score.  Despite factor 
analysis revealing a strong single dimension in the K10 [20], Schnittker [19] has employed this same two- 
factor model (referring to the psychological factor as an “affective” factor) in a previous study, assigning 
“tired for no good reason,” “restless or fidgety,” “so restless you could not sit still,” and “everything an 
effort” to the somatic subscale, and the remaining six items to the psychological/affective subscale, a 
scheme used in the present study as well. 
 
This somatization measure is modeled in two ways, as a continuous measure and a five-level 
categorical measure. The latter is necessitated by the fact that 543 participants in the part 2 sample (11 
percent) endorsed no distress symptoms and therefore had a somatization score of 0 and contributed 
no information on somatization.  They comprised 44 percent of all individuals with a 0 somatization 
score (the others with this score being those having equal scores on the somatic and psychological 
factors).  By creating a five-level somatization variable, those with a 0 score and those at the low and 
high ends of somatization could be isolated, and a non-linear relationship with depression screener 
endorsement (expected by inclusion of participants endorsing no distress items and therefore not likely 
to endorse a screening symptom) could be modeled.  The primary analysis for this study was done, 
however, among the 4,275 participants who endorsed at least one distress symptom and therefore 
contributed data on somatization.  For this analysis, somatization was measured continuously.  A 
secondary analysis was conducted in the full sample (i.e., including those who endorsed no distress 





Somatic health.  These data were ascertained in the NCS-R by asking participants if a doctor or health 
professional had ever told them they had any of eight conditions: heart disease, high blood pressure, 
asthma, chronic lung disease, diabetes or high blood sugar, ulcer, epilepsy, and cancer. Participants 
were then asked if they still had the condition or if they were currently being treated for it; positive 
endorsements of this follow-up question were summed to create this measure.  Scores could range from 




All analyses were conducted using SAS software’s (version 9.3, SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC) 
survey procedures (SURVEYMEANS, SURVEYREG, and SURVEYLOGISTIC) to account for NCS-R’s survey 
weights and complex sampling design.  Accordingly, all results reported below are weighted to the US 
population and the standard errors account for the multi-strata sampling design.  The primary analysis 
was conducted in the subsample (n = 4,275) who endorsed at least one K10 item at any level and who 
therefore provided at least some information on somatization.  A secondary analysis was conducted in 
the full sample (n = 4,897). All analyses adjusted for age and sex, either through standardization to the 
White distribution when means were compared, or in multivariable logistic regression. Differences in 
the means between groups for somatic health, distress, somatization, and underlying dimensions of 
somatization were tested using the SURVEYREG procedure, which allowed for age- and sex-
standardizing using the estimate procedure. Significance tests of these mean differences using t-tests 
were conducted on openepi.com.  The second hypothesis was tested using the SURVEYLOGISTIC 
procedure and adjusted for distress, age, sex, and somatization.  In testing the first hypothesis in the 










This study tested a methodological explanation for the paradoxical finding from large 
epidemiologic studies of discordant Black-White findings on depression and distress. As a first step it 
was necessary to document the paradox in the NCS-R data set in the full sample.  In the NCS-R, Blacks 
had a lower prevalence than Whites of past-year major depressive disorder, adjusting for age and sex 
(Black prevalence = 4.19%, White prevalence = 6.90%; t = 876.72, p < 0.0001; OR = 0.62, 95% confidence 
interval (CI), 0.46 – 0.83). Judging by the odds ratio and the confidence interval, the upper bound of 
which is well below 1.0, this was an appreciable difference.  Whites had a slightly higher age- and sex-
adjusted mean distress score, but the difference was not statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level 
(Black mean = 5.84, White mean = 6.59; t = 1.97, p = 0.05).   Thus, the paradox of interest in this study 
was present in the NCS-R sample.  Results from testing the two hypotheses are presented below, first 
from the primary sample and then from the secondary sample.  All analyses were based on a sample 





The first hypothesis was that Blacks somatize the expression of distress more than Whites, 




Table 1, which shows that Blacks had a statistically significantly (p < 0.05) higher mean somatization 
score than Whites.  Somatic health was not adjusted for in this comparison since there was no 
meaningful difference between Blacks and Whites on this measure (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 also shows the results of Black-White comparisons on the underlying dimensions of the 
somatization measure.  Among the four somatic items, Blacks had a statistically significantly higher 
mean score on the “everything an effort” item (this item also had the largest absolute difference in 
Black-White scores among the 10 items in the measure), but Whites had a statistically significantly 
higher mean score on the “restless or fidgety” item. Whites had higher scores than Blacks on the other 
two somatic items but these were not statistically significant. Among the six psychological symptoms, 
Whites were higher than Blacks on all, but only two of these differences (“nervous” and “hopeless”) 
were statistically significant.  In a composite measure summing mean scores across the four somatic 
items, Whites had a slightly higher score but the difference was not statistically significant.  In a 
composite measure of the six psychological items, Whites were statistically significantly higher than 
Blacks.  These results indicate that Blacks’ higher somatization score was driven by their high score on 
one somatic item and by Whites’ higher scores on the psychological items.  There was no evidence of a 
general tendency for Blacks to endorse somatic items more than Whites; if anything, the evidence 
points to a general tendency for Whites to endorse psychological items at a higher level than Blacks. 
 
 The second hypothesis was that, adjusting for distress, Blacks would have a lower likelihood 
than Whites of endorsing a depression screening symptom, and this would be explained by Blacks’ 
greater somatization.  Results from testing this hypothesis, shown in Table 2, do not support it.  Model 1 
shows that Blacks had lower odds of endorsing a screening symptom, adjusting for distress, age, and sex, 




health to the model (model 2) had no meaningful effect on the race odds ratio. Therefore, at the same 
levels of distress, Blacks did not have statistically significantly lower odds than Whites of endorsing a 
screening symptom, and adjusting for somatization did not alter this. Had Blacks’ higher somatization 
constrained them from endorsing the psychological screening symptoms, adjusting for this factor in the 
second model would have appreciably narrowed the Black-White odds ratio of endorsing a screening 




 Results from the secondary analysis, conducted in the full sample, were consistent with those 
from the primary analysis.  As discussed above, the full sample was not used in the primary analysis 
because 11 percent of the full sample endorsed no past-year distress symptoms and therefore 
contributed no information on somatization.  However, to test the robustness of the findings from the 
smaller, primary sample, the same hypotheses were tested in the full sample but with somatization 
modeled categorically in most analyses, for reasons here explained.  Table S1 shows how somatization 
scores and frequencies were arrayed across the five somatization categories in this sample, ranging from 
Low (those whose actual somatization scores ranged from -16 to -3) to High (those whose actual 
somatization scores ranged from +2 to +12).  Those with somatization scores of 0 formed the largest 
category and of these, 44 percent in the weighted sample endorsed no distress symptoms at all.  This 
would induce artifactual downward pressure on the somatization-screener endorsement relationship if 
somatization were modeled continuously in this sample, since the modal somatization score was 0 and 
nearly half of these endorsed no distress symptoms and therefore had a low probability of endorsing a 
depression screening symptom.  By modeling somatization categorically, the anticipated v-shaped 




Results from testing the first hypothesis – that Blacks somatize the expression of distress more 
than Whites – are shown in Tables S2 and S3.  This hypothesis was supported when somatization was 
modeled continuously (for descriptive purposes) (Table S2), but not when modeled categorically (for 
analytic purposes) (Table S3).  Thus, Table S2 shows in the first row that Blacks had a statistically 
significantly higher mean somatization score than Whites when somatization was modeled continuously. 
There was no meaningful difference on somatic health conditions between Blacks and Whites (Table S2) 
and so this factor was not adjusted for when comparing the groups on somatization.  Black-White 
differences on the underlying dimensions of somatization (Table S2) closely paralleled those from the 
primary analysis, with no meaningful changes to highlight. This is not surprising given that the secondary 
sample was only 13 percent larger than the primary sample and the augmentation consisted entirely of 
participants who endorsed no distress items. 
 
Table S3 compares Blacks and Whites on somatization where it was the categorical outcome of a 
polytomous regression, adjusting for age, sex, somatic health, and distress.  Distress was adjusted for 
because Whites were slightly higher than Blacks on this factor and the K10 favors psychological to 
somatic items at a 6:4 ratio; thus higher distress scores artifactually (i.e., purely as a function of the 6:4 
ratio) suppressed somatization scores.  In effect, distress became a not-of-interest mediator between 
race and somatization, and adjusting for it removed this meditational effect. The equation modeled the 
odds of being in each of the four higher somatization categories compared to the odds of being in the 
lowest category.  We see that Blacks’ odds of being in higher somatization categories compared to the 
lowest category were not statistically significantly higher than Whites’ odds, although there was a slight 





 Results from testing the second hypothesis – that Blacks are less likely than Whites to endorse a 
screening symptom, adjusting for distress, and this is explained by Blacks’ greater somatization – are 
shown in Table S4.  They are virtually identical to the results from testing this hypothesis in the primary 
analysis, and therefore did not support the hypothesis.  There was no statistically significant difference 
in Blacks’ and Whites’ odds of endorsing a screening symptom, both without (model 1) and with (model 
2) somatization in the model. 
 
In brief, this study found evidence of slightly greater distress somatization in Blacks than Whites, 
although this difference was explained by one somatic item (“everything an effort”) and by Whites’ 
general tendency to score higher than Blacks on psychological distress items. These results did not 
support a broad hypothesis that in the US, Blacks express distress or depression more somatically than 
Whites.  Moreover, no evidence was found that the modest Black-White difference on somatization 





 This study tested a methodological explanation for the consistent paradoxical finding of equal 
and higher distress levels in Blacks than Whites, coupled with a lower prevalence of depression.  Two 
hypotheses were tested.  The first was that Blacks express distress more somatically than Whites.  The 
second was that Blacks’ greater distress somatization explains their lower likelihood than Whites, 
adjusting for distress, of endorsing major depression screening symptoms.  All analyses were conducted 
in the NCS-R data set, were adjusted for differences in the age and sex distributions between Blacks and 





 The paradox to be explained, of a lower prevalence of depression in Blacks than Whites coupled 
with equal or higher levels of distress, was documented in the NCS-R sample.    However, a recent 
systematic review [1] of Black-White distress comparisons showed higher distress levels in Blacks than 
Whites in 34 of 35 comparisons, though not all of these were statistically significant.  In the NCS-R 
sample, Whites had higher distress levels than Blacks, though it was not a statistically significant 
difference.  These distress findings mean that the paradox of interest in this sample is a slightly weaker 
version than might be present in other samples.  Nevertheless, the relevant hypothesis in this study was 
that Blacks would have a lower probability than Whites of endorsing a screening symptom adjusting for 
distress, and therefore the slight divergence of the Black-White distress findings in the NCS-R sample 
from those of the systematic review would not have a meaningful effect on this analysis.  
 
Although results were consistent with the first hypothesis of greater distress somatization in 
Blacks than Whites, the Black-White somatization difference was quite small despite being statistically 
significant.  The meaningfulness of this small difference is further tempered by examining the underlying 
symptom structure of the somatization measure.  The difference found on the somatization measure 
was driven by one somatic symptom (“everything an effort”) and a greater tendency in Whites to 
endorse the psychological items. In fact, Whites had higher scores than Blacks on nine of the 10 items in 
the distress measure, though only a few of these differences were statistically significant.  When somatic 
and psychological items were summarized in two composite scores, Whites were higher than Blacks in 
both, but only the psychological score difference was statistically significant.  These results, if anything, 
provide modest support for a broad psychologization hypothesis [108] in Whites, and no support for a 





Results did not support the second hypothesis.  There was no statistically significant difference 
between Blacks’ and Whites’ odds of endorsing depression screening symptoms, adjusting for distress. 
Further adjusting for somatization did not change this. 
 
 Thus, evidence from the NCS-R does not support the idea that greater somatization in Blacks 
suppresses their endorsement of screening symptoms, thereby explaining the paradox of discordant 
Black-White comparisons on depression and distress. The evidence also does not support the notion of a 
generalized tendency in Blacks to express distress more somatically than Whites. Where does this leave 
the Black-White depression-distress paradox? 
 
One option is to presume the depression and distress findings are valid and to propose a 
substantive explanation for why Blacks have less depression than Whites.  To date, these proposals have 
included positing greater religiosity, higher self-esteem, and stronger social support [4, 36, 66–68] in 
Blacks than Whites – all factors thought to have dimensions protective against depression.  Strong tests 
of the social support hypothesis have failed [66, 68] to corroborate it, however, and no empirical 
evidence related to the other explanations has been reported, to my knowledge.  A more recent 
hypothesis [4, 5, 69] proposes an interaction between race, stress, and poor health behaviors (e.g., 
alcohol consumption) such that at higher stressor levels, these behaviors are more protective against 
depression in Blacks than in Whites, while simultaneously leading to worse somatic health in Blacks.  
Tests of the hypothesis have had mixed results [4, 69, 70]. 
 
Aside from the lack of evidence, two main problems arise with substantive explanations for the 
Black-White depression paradox.  First, they do not account for the Black-White distress findings.  That is, 




but not distress, or protect Blacks from depression so much more effectively than from distress.  If 
anything, one might think protective factors would work in the short term against the intermediate and 
less severe outcome of distress, but have diminishing returns over time, or in the face of larger life 
stressors, and ultimately fail to protect against depression.  Second, the social stress paradigm predicts 
worse mental health outcomes in disadvantaged groups in part by virtue of poorer coping resources.  To 
explain the paradox of a lower prevalence of depression in Blacks than Whites by virtue of better coping 
resources simply recreates the paradox at the locus of the hypothesized mediator, and entails a new 
paradox to explain. 
 
Another option is to pursue additional artifactual explanations for the inconsistent depression 
and distress findings between Blacks and Whites. From the perspective of the social stress paradigm, the 
depression findings are the logical place to explore methodologic problems since they, rather than the 
distress findings, contradict the theory.  One could pursue this line either as a loyal defender of the 
social stress paradigm or as a conservator of theory in general.  That is, good or good enough theory is 
rare and findings contradicting it should be rigorously interrogated for bias. Alternatively, one could 
argue that a theory’s predictions should not be expected to hold in every test of them [82], that this is 
too high a bar for any theory. Yet the Black-White depression comparison is a strong [15] test of the 
theory and results of this test should not be lightly dismissed as tolerable aberrations. That is, if the 
theory does not work for this comparison, what stock can we put in it? 
 
 Methodological explanations for the Black-White depression-distress paradox remain to be 
tested.  As discussed in the Introduction, the depression interview, because of a relatively complicated 
algorithm that entails a series of exclusion criteria, presents more possibilities for error than the distress 




step of the algorithm, the required endorsement of a screening symptom, adjusting for distress.  A 
similar approach could be applied to subsequent steps in the algorithm.  That is, there are various points 
in the diagnostic interview at which individuals can be excluded from the diagnosis.  The Black-White 
prevalence ratio of depression in a given study is determined by the proportion in each group that is 
excluded at each step across the interview.  Thus, one could determine which step(s) in this exclusion 
process has the biggest impact on the final Black-White prevalence ratio in each study in which the 
depression paradox has been documented.  A consistent pattern across studies would provide the 
clearest clue for where and how bias might affect Black and White depression estimates. 
 
A recent study [149] provided evidence from one of the studies documenting the Black-White 
depression paradox that Blacks are substantially more likely than Whites to be excluded from the 
diagnosis by endorsing either the medical condition or bereavement exclusion criteria (both criteria 
were lumped into one question, so it is impossible to distinguish which it might have been in the 
relevant study, if not both). If this pattern obtains in other studies, the question is whether it is a valid 
reflection of the DSM criteria.  If so, this can be ruled out as a source of methodological error in the 
Black-White depression finding.  If not valid, however, and Blacks are more likely to endorse these 
criteria than Whites, then this suggests a point in the depression interview where methodological error 
accounts for at least some of the Black-White depression paradox. In short, the exclusion features of the 
diagnostic interview for major depression present opportunities to develop methodological explanations 
for the Black-White depression paradox.  Any consequent explanation showing that the higher 
prevalence of depression in Whites owes to methodologic error in a given exclusion criterion would 






A curious wrinkle in the Black-White depression-distress paradox is that after controlling for 
socio-economic status in some studies [43, 56, 86], Blacks have a lower level of distress than Whites, 
resulting in concordant Black-White distress and depression findings, in terms of direction.  This would 
appear to weaken social stress theory, since controlling for socio-economic variables still leaves residual 
socio-economic differences and fails to account for Blacks’ exposure to more interpersonal 
discrimination than Whites.   This persistent Black-White imbalance in stressor exposure should still 
produce greater distress in Blacks than Whites.  That it does not in these studies is consistent with the 
presence of a substantive factor that disproportionately protects Blacks from poor mental health 
outcomes.  However, it could be consistent with artifactual explanations as well.  Moreover, adjustment 
for socio-economic factors further attenuates the Black-White depression odds ratio in the NCS-R 
sample (results not shown), and thus the absolute value of the gap between Black-White distress and 
depression findings remains.  Accordingly, we would still need to account for why ostensible protective 
factors are so much more effective against disorder than distress.  But finally, the social stress paradigm 
generally does not parse stressor exposures into categories but rather considers the totality of stressor 
exposures.  When this totality is considered (i.e., via Black-White comparisons adjusted at most for sex 
and age), Blacks generally have higher distress than Whites [1]. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
 
The primary strengths of this study are that it used data from a large, nationally representative 
sample using a measure of distress that has high sensitivity for psychiatric disorder.  Moreover, the 
depression interview and the K10 as operationalized in the NCS-R target the same time period during 
the past year, which should maximize concordance in their results.  This high sensitivity and temporal 




distress results are discordant between Blacks and Whites is not that these are different constructs on 
which Blacks and Whites differ, but rather that these are overlapping constructs and the discordance 
owes to differential item response on the screening symptoms. Using a distress measure highly 
correlated with depression diagnoses gives us greater confidence that we are testing this hypothesized 
difference rather than differences in the constructs themselves. 
 
Three limitations of this study are noted as well. First, depression symptoms and distress may 
have been inaccurately reported, leading to misclassification of the distress and screening symptom 
measures.  To the extent this misclassification was differential by race, estimates of somatization, 
distress, and screening symptom endorsement may be under- or over-estimated in each race group. 
Second, the measure of somatic health was sub-optimal because it included only eight conditions and 
each required a diagnosis from a medical professional. Strong evidence exists that in the US Blacks have 
worse access to health care and receive poorer care than Whites [92, 134–138].  Therefore, Blacks may 
under-report somatic health conditions more than Whites in this study.  To the extent this was true, it 
would inflate somatization scores to a greater extent in Blacks than Whites – regardless of whether or 
not somatic health is adjusted for -- and the higher level of somatization in Blacks than Whites found in 
this study could be an artifact.  Third, in the NCS-R sample, Blacks did not have statistically significantly 
worse somatic health than Whites, as this variable was measured in the study.  This is inconsistent with 
the large body of research documenting that Blacks have worse somatic health than Whites in the US 
[92, 139–141].  It could be due to disproportionate, though inadvertent, under-reporting of somatic 
conditions in Blacks, as just discussed, or to the limited number of somatic conditions measured, or to 
random chance in the sample.   The first two reasons have the same implications for the findings: Blacks’ 
somatization score would be biased upward more than Whites’ score.  However, since there was no 




endorsement of screening symptoms, this possible inflation of Blacks’ somatization score would have no 
impact on my conclusions.  On the other hand, if the somatic health of Blacks in this sample was better, 
by chance, than the somatic health of adult Blacks living in households nationwide, it is not clear that 
this would have impacted the conclusions.  Black somatization scores may have been higher in a more 
representative Black sample, in terms of somatic health, but adjusting for somatic health ostensibly 




 In this study, although Blacks did have a higher level of distress somatization than Whites, the 
difference was not large and was driven by one somatic symptom and Whites’ greater tendency than 
Blacks to psychologize distress.  In the end, it was not a meaningful difference and did not constrain 
Blacks from endorsing the depression screening symptoms.   The data from this study do not support 
the hypothesis that the Black-White depression-distress paradox can be explained by greater 
somatization in Blacks.  The development and testing of additional methodological hypotheses that 




Table 1.  Blacks' and Whites' age- and sex-standardized means and prevalences among those endorsing at least one 
distress symptom in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (2001-2003) 
      
  Black White   
    611 (14.13%)
1
 3,664 (85.87%) t value p value 
Somatization mean (SE), range -24 to +16
 
  -0.02 (0.15) -0.36 (0.05) -2.48 0.01 
Somatic health conditions mean (SE), range 0-7  1.03 (0.06) 1.01 (0.04) -0.20 0.84 
Distress mean (SE), range 0 - 40  7.14 (0.36) 7.72 (0.14) 1.56 0.12 
      
Underlying dimensions of somatization and depression      
Somatic symptom means (SE), range 0-4      
Low energy  1.19 (0.07) 1.28 (0.02) 1.59 0.11 
Restless or fidgety  0.83 (0.06) 1.05 (0.02) 4.02 < 0.01 
Couldn't sit still  0.40 (0.04) 0.48 (0.02) 1.55 0.12 
Everything an effort  1.15 (0.09) 0.87 (0.03) -3.41 < 0.01 
Psychological symptom means (SE), range 0-4      
Nervous  1.06 (0.06) 1.21 (0.02) 2.74 0.01 
Couldn't calm down  0.31 (0.04) 0.35 (0.02) 0.78 0.44 
Hopeless  0.42 (0.05) 0.55 (0.02) 2.45 0.01 
Depressed  1.01 (0.05) 1.07 (0.02) 1.13 0.26 
Couldn't cheer up  0.43 (0.05) 0.45 (0.02) 0.38 0.71 
Worthless  0.35 (0.03) 0.42 (0.02) 1.39 0.17 
Somatic symptoms, mean  (SE), range 0-16  3.56 (0.18) 3.68 (0.07) 0.64 0.52 
Psychological symptoms, mean (SE), range 0-24   3.58 (0.21) 4.04 (0.08) 2.15 0.03 
      
      
Note. All comparisons are based on weighted sample.      
1 
unweighted n (weighted %) 
 





Table 2.  Logistic regression of race predicting screener endorsement, adjusting 
for distress, age, sex, somatization, and somatic health among those endorsing 
at least one distress symptom in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication 
(2001-2003) 
       
  Model 1  Model 2 
    OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI 
Race (ref = White)  0.75 0.52 - 1.08  0.77 0.54 - 1.10 
Distress  1.18 1.16 - 1.19  1.13 1.11 - 1.15 
Age                                   0.84 0.76 - 0.93  0.78 0.71 - 0.87 
Sex (ref = male)  1.11 0.91 - 1.37  1.03 0.84 - 1.26 
Somatization      0.88 0.84 - 0.91 
Somatic health     1.34 1.21 - 1.49 
       






Table S1. Somatization categories in the full sample, 
National Comorbidity Survey Replication (2001-2003) 








Low -16 to  -3  965 (14.7)  
Medium low -2 and -1  1,014 (20.8)  
Medium 0  1,223 (29.8)   
Medium high 1 and 2  1,119 (24.6)  
High 3 to 12  497 (10.2)  
   
1






Table S2.  Blacks' and Whites' age-and sex-standardized means and prevalences in the full sample, National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication (2001-2003) 
      
  Black White   
    717 (14.53%)
1
 4,180 (85.47%) t value p value 
Somatization mean (SE), range -24 to +16
 
  -0.03 (0.13) -0.33 (0.04) -2.71 0.01 
Somatic health conditions mean (SE), range 0-7  0.92 (0.05) 0.97 (0.04) 0.51 0.61 
Distress mean (SE), range 0 - 40  5.84 (0.33) 6.59 (0.15) 1.97 0.05 
      
Underlying dimensions of somatization and depression      
Somatic symptom means (SE), range 0-4      
Low energy  0.95 (0.06) 1.08 (0.03) 1.70 0.09 
Restless or fidgety  0.66 (0.05) 0.89 (0.02) 4.38 <.0001 
Couldn't sit still  0.31 (0.03) 0.41 (0.02) 2.01 0.05 
Everything an effort  0.92 (0.07) 0.74 (0.02) -3.20 0.001 
Psychological symptom means (SE), range 0-4      
Nervous  0.87 (0.05) 1.03 (0.02) 3.05 0.002 
Couldn't calm down  0.26 (0.03) 0.30 (0.02) 0.80 0.42 
Hopeless  0.34 (0.04) 0.47 (0.02) 2.55 0.01 
Depressed  0.82 (0.05) 0.91 (0.02) 1.71 0.09 
Couldn't cheer up  0.35 (0.05) 0.39 (0.01) 1.26 0.21 
Worthless  0.28 (0.03) 0.35 (0.01) 2.58 0.01 
Somatic symptoms, mean (SE), range 0-16  2.84 (0.17) 3.11 (0.08) 1.31 0.19 
Psychological symptoms, mean (SE), range 0-24  2.94 (0.19) 3.47 (0.07) 2.84 0.01 
      
      
Note. All comparisons are based on weighted sample.      
1
  unweighted n (weighted percent) 






Table S3.  Polytomous regression of somatization on race, adjusting for 
age, sex, somatic health, and distress in the full sample, National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication (2001-2003) 
    
  Somatization (ref = low)
1
 OR 95% CI 
Race (ref = White) medium low 1.00 0.60 - 1.69 
 medium 1.00 0.66 - 1.50 
 medium high 1.08 0.64 - 1.83 
 high  1.25 0.70 - 2.22 
    
Age medium low 0.96 0.80 - 1.15 
 medium 1.11 0.95 - 1.30 
 medium high 0.94 0.79 - 1.13 
 high  1.15 0.94 - 1.40 
    
Sex medium low 0.89 0.68 - 1.17 
 medium 0.89 0.67 - 1.19 
 medium high 0.93 0.71 - 1.22 
 high  0.64 0.48 - 0.85 
    
Somatic health medium low 1.04 0.94 - 1.15 
 medium 1.00 0.86 - 1.15 
 medium high 1.14 1.00 - 1.29 
 high  1.20 1.06 - 1.37 
    
Distress medium low 0.84 0.82 - 0.85 
 medium 0.67 0.64 - 0.70 
 medium high 0.78 0.77 - 0.80 
 high  0.87 0.85 - 0.88 
    
Note. Analysis used weighted sample.   
1
  Actual somatization scores in each category are: "low" (ref) (-16 to -3); 
"medium low" (-2 and -1) "medium" (0, which includes those endorsing 





Chapter 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has roots in my interest in American race history and my first glimpse nine 
years ago of the Black-White depression finding.  Before knowing anything about social stress theory, I 
found it richly ironic that arguably the most marginalized group in American history turned out to have 
less depression than the marginalizing group. A sample of one is not exactly epidemiology, but my 
reaction suggests that the core principal of social stress theory – social disadvantage is bad for mental 
health -- is not an academic abstraction but perhaps a common or even universal intuition. 
 
Nine years later, my motivation to search for a methodological explanation for the double 
paradox stems from both disenchantment with substantive explanations and an interest in taking a 
conservative approach to doing science. As noted throughout my dissertation, the substantive 
explanations proffered to date do not come to terms with the distress findings and therefore fail to be 
conceptually convincing. Regarding a conservative approach to doing science, systematically testing 
methodological explanations for the counter-intuitive double paradox seems more efficient and logical 
than prematurely rejecting a theory, or proceeding a-theoretically.  Consequently, methodological 
explanations became my focus. 
 
Results from the first paper make it clear that the double paradox does not reflect a selective 
reading of the literature but is an extremely consistent finding.  The somatization hypothesis offered 
one solution to both paradoxes.  It would account for both a lower prevalence of depression in Blacks 
than Whites and for why this pattern does not occur with distress.  It also offered a chance to conduct a 




Whites -- and to either find support for it or lay it to rest.  This dissertation found no support for a broad 
hypothesis of greater somatization in Blacks than Whites.  Instead what it found were two different 
somatic symptoms – one in each study – which Blacks were much more likely to endorse than Whites 
and a broad tendency in Whites to endorse psychological symptoms more than Blacks.  However, these 
two somatic symptoms and the tendency to endorse psychological symptoms in Whites was not 
sufficient to create either a big difference between Blacks and Whites on the somatization measure, or 
for that small difference to explain Black and White screener endorsement patterns. Thus, this 
dissertation’s findings ultimately do not support a meaningful difference between Blacks and Whites in 
their symptom endorsement patterns. 
 
This conclusion of no consequential Black-White difference on somatization is based on data 
from two of the four nationally representative psychiatric epidemiology studies that document the 
double paradox.  The two other studies (the National Comorbidity Survey, and the National 
Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions) do not lend themselves to testing the 
somatization hypothesis because they lack measures in which somatization can be adequately assessed.  
Nevertheless, this dissertation’s tests of the somatization hypothesis, though far from perfect because 
the data were not collected with this question in mind, are good enough to make me inclined to rule this 
explanation out in the future.  They are good enough tests of somatization because the AUDADIS-IV 
depression interview and the K10 were employed in representative samples of the US household 
population and both have a good balance of the common somatic and psychological expressions of 
depression and distress, respectively.  As well, the results were consistent across the two papers and 





The diagnostic interview for major depression winnows individuals from a depression diagnosis 
across seven exclusion criteria: not endorsing a screening symptom; not endorsing five or more 
symptoms; not being clinically significant; ever having had a manic episode; and, the depression being 
better accounted for by bereavement within two months of a loss, by a medical condition 
physiologically causing the depression, or by use of or withdrawal from alcohol or a medication or drug.  
The key then to understanding why Blacks have a lower prevalence than Whites of major depression in 
the psychiatric epidemiology studies is to see which of these seven steps accounts for the greatest 
attenuation in the Black-White prevalence ratio across the interview.  Not all of the psychiatric 
epidemiology studies operationalize all of these steps, and there is variability in how well they 
implement them, so this approach is best leveraged by studying these patterns across studies to see 
where the preponderance of the evidence lies. 
 
The subsequent step would be to understand why the attenuation in the Black-White 
prevalence ratio happens where it does, taking into account both methodological and substantive 
explanations.  Distinguishing between these two categories of explanation in this context is not 
necessarily easy.  For example, if the greatest attenuation occurred with the clinical significance criterion, 
one might look for consistency with other information study participants provide in the full study 
interview to help determine whether the attenuation was due to artifact or a substantive reason.  
Participants’ biased reporting is suggested when this other information is inconsistent with endorsing, or 
failing to endorse, clinical significance.  Inconsistency that is more common in Blacks or Whites points to 
a methodological explanation for the Black-White depression paradox.  Alternatively, no Black-White 
differences on inconsistent reporting points to a substantive explanation for why Blacks are more likely 





The question then is what next steps should be taken towards resolving the double paradox.  
One clear approach is suggested in results from the second paper, where it was shown that Blacks were 
nearly 50 percent more likely than Whites to say that their past-year depression symptoms co-occurred 
with physical illness or bereavement and who were consequently excluded from the diagnosis. However, 
this was an overly broad operationalization of the DSM exclusion criteria that most certainly led to 
invalid exclusions that were most likely disproportionately Black.  Future research should examine how 
carefully these exclusion criteria were operationalized in other studies documenting the Black-White 
depression paradox, and if meaningful differences in Black and White endorsement patterns persist with 
more precise rendering of these criteria.  If this pattern does persist across more careful renderings of 
the criteria, it becomes less plausible that these specific criteria contribute to bias in Black-White 
depression prevalence ratio estimates.  At stake is that greater morbidity and mortality in Blacks than 
Whites could lead to disproportionately greater invalid exclusions in Blacks than Whites based on poorly 
operationalized medical condition and bereavement exclusions, as was most likely demonstrated in the 
NLAES data set.   Blacks’ greater morbidity and mortality than Whites are legitimate causes of major 
depression outside of cases directly and physiologically caused by a medical condition, and 
inappropriate winnowing of these legitimate cases from a diagnosis could explain much of the Black-
White depression paradox.  
 
As noted throughout the dissertation, it is incumbent on all substantive explanations for the 
Black-White depression paradox to also account for the contrasting Black-White distress findings.  Not 
because depression and distress are synonymous but because they are similar enough that whatever 
protects against depression ought to also protect against distress.  Moreover, social stress theory makes 





It is also important to note that the development of methodological and substantive 
explanations should focus on Whites as much as Blacks.  Accordingly, it should not be assumed that 
estimates of disorder and distress in Whites are less biased than they might be in Blacks. For example, 
Whites may be overly prone to endorse diagnostic symptoms because of anti-depressant media 
campaigns targeting them or because of cultural factors in which problems are too readily reduced to or 
described by psychological factors or language.  On the substantive side, harmful factors more prevalent 
in Whites are just as likely to occur as protective factors in Blacks. For instance, cultural atomization may 
play an etiologic role in psychiatric disorder and may also be more widespread among Whites than 
Blacks [150–152].  As well, the same substantive explanation could be framed from either the White or 
Black perspective: whatever harmful factor is posited to be more prevalent in Whites, its opposite could 
be posited to be more prevalent in Blacks.  Thus atomism more prevalent in Whites could be re-framed 
as communalism more prevalent in Blacks.  The bottom line is that findings in Whites should never be 
viewed as inerrant or as necessarily defining acceptable norms. 
 
A final, broader question, and one implicit throughout this dissertation, is what the implications 
of my findings are for the social stress paradigm.  I framed Black-White mental health comparisons as a 
strong test of this paradigm, and the Black-White depression paradox as a potential threat to the 
paradigm’s credibility.  Having ruled out a plausible methodological explanation for the double paradox, 
how do I now view the social stress paradigm in the context of a still unresolved double paradox, while 
also taking into account that substantive explanations have performed no better than methodological 
explanations at resolving the paradoxes?  In the context of the still unresolved double paradox, and in 
light of the fact that methodological explanations remain to be tested, the social stress paradigm 
remains viable. However, the paradigm must be judged in a broader context.  After all, this is not the 




outcomes by sex [153] and social class [32, 84] also fail to conform neatly to the theory’s predictions 
since women and men have approximately equal levels of mental and substance use disorders, and the 
findings for social class are uneven depending on how one measures class (e.g., education, income), and 
even within a given measure the findings vary across studies. Sexual orientation is one exception to this 
pattern, given that lesbians, gays, and bisexuals are generally found to have a higher prevalence of 
psychiatric disorder than heterosexuals [154, 155]. Despite this exception, across four central axes of 
social division (race, sex, class, and sexual orientation), the empirical evidence supporting social stress 
theory is not strong.  This broader context of uneven findings could make one less sanguine about social 
stress theory’s viability. 
 
However, is the problem with the social stress paradigm or with how we measure mental 
health?  Intriguingly, the distress findings across the four social axes defined in the previous paragraph 
do conform better to social stress paradigm predictions than do the psychiatric disorder findings [1, 
156–158].  Therefore, if there is a measurement problem, then perhaps, as proposed in this dissertation, 
the greater problem is in how we measure disorder, not how we measure distress.  The evidence for 
criterion validity in the psychiatric epidemiology studies, measured as diagnostic or prevalence 
concordance between structured lay interview and clinician interview diagnoses is poor [32, 67, 159].  
The National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria project (RDoC), which seeks to 
redefine mental disorder according to objective physiological markers rather than symptom self-report 
to improve the validity of psychiatric disorder diagnoses, underscores this apparent weakness in current 
measures of mental disorder.  It is arguably then too optimistic to presume general validity in the 
psychiatric epidemiology studies regarding group differences in disorder. Until the validity of psychiatric 
diagnosis improves, it would be precipitous to count social stress theory out on the basis of dis-
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My systematic literature review was limited to PubMed and PsycINFO databases, and did not 
include a review of grey literature, such as non peer-reviewed reports from government agencies.  
However, I supplemented the systematic review with articles and grey literature I had already collected. 
Between these sources, I was confident I would collect all eligible articles on major depression, given the 
limited number of eligible studies.  I was also familiar enough with the distress findings to know that 
examples of Blacks having lower distress levels than Whites were rare and that my systematic review 
and existing store of articles would sufficiently capture the Black-White distress pattern. 
 
Exclusion of National Survey of American Life (NSAL) from depression findings   
 
Findings from the NSAL study, which was conducted concurrently with the National Comorbidity 
Survey Replication (NCS-R), were excluded in this systematic review because, despite meeting most 
eligibility criteria, the study only sampled Whites living in census tracts with an African-American 
population of at least 10 percent, which represents only 14 percent of Whites in the US [67].  Despite 
the fact that the data were then weighted to the US population by several demographic characteristics, 
they could not be weighted to account for this particular sampling feature. Nevertheless, in the NSAL, 
African Americans had a lower prevalence than Whites of lifetime, past year, and past 30-day major 
depression, and Caribbean Americans had a lower prevalence than Whites of lifetime and past 30-day 
depression [67]. These findings are consistent with the majority of findings reported in this paper.  I am 





Estimating prevalence ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals for major depression in Table 2 and 
high distress in Table 3a and 3b 
 
I estimated the prevalence ratios and confidence intervals in openepi.com where I entered each 
group’s data in a 2x2 table.  Figures for populating the 2x2 cells were derived from applying the Black 
and White prevalence figures reported in each study to the unweighted sample sizes.  The openepi.com 
output from these data are risk ratios and their 95 percent confidence intervals (Taylor series); I call the 
former “prevalence ratios” in my review. 
 
Estimating t-tests to compare mean distress levels in Table 4 
 
I used openepi.com to conduct t-tests of Black-White differences in distress means whenever 
















I considered four options for operationalizing somatization: as a difference score between 
somatic and psychological symptoms endorsed, as a ratio of somatic to psychological symptoms 
endorsed, as a proportion of somatic symptoms to total symptoms endorsed, and as somatic symptoms 
and psychological symptoms endorsed as two separate continuous variables.  In view of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each, on balance the first of these offered the best solution.  
 
Somatization as a ratio of somatic to psychological items endorsed, or the reverse, entails a zero 
in the denominator in many cases, which is nonsensical and mathematically unworkable.  Somatic items 
as a proportion of total items endorsed is conceptually problematic because a hypothetical person A 
endorsing 1 somatic symptom and no psychological symptoms would have a proportion score of 100%, 
whereas a hypothetical person B endorsing four somatic and one psychological symptom would have a 
proportion score of 80%.  Person B has relatively high distress and we know that they express it 
relatively somatically.  Person A has comparatively low distress and we do not know, based on this, how 
they would express distress at higher levels, but there is a chance that they would express it less 
somatically than person B.  Therefore, it seems to lack face validity to assign a higher somatization score 
to person A than to person B. Somatic and psychological item endorsements as separate continuous 
measures is a problem because both measures would be strongly collinear with the measure of 
underlying depression (a pure symptom count across the seven symptoms) and all three measures 
would be included in the full model testing the second hypothesis.  Alternatively, underlying depression 




endorsements would capture the same information.  The weakness of this alternative is that a one-unit 
increment in the somatic score would have the same impact on the probability of endorsing a screening 
symptom regardless of the psychological measure score, which is a sub-optimal rendering of depression 
somatization, a point elaborated on below. 
 
The difference measure does not have these weaknesses.  As a non-ratio measure, it avoids the 
problem of having a zero in the denominator.  As a non-proportion measure, it circumvents the specific 
problem of low face-validity highlighted in the previous paragraph.      It also avoids the problem of 
obvious collinearity with underlying depression introduced by creating separate measures for 
psychological and somatic symptom endorsements.  The primary strength of the difference score is that 
the effect of a one-unit increase in somatic endorsements on the probability of endorsing a screening 
symptom depends on the level of psychological endorsements.  By contrast, if somatization is modeled 
using two different variables, one for somatic symptom endorsement and one for psychological 
symptom endorsements, the effect of a one-unit increase in somatic endorsements on the probability of 
endorsing a screening symptom is independent of the number of psychological symptom endorsements.  
The advantage of dependence on psychological symptom endorsements is that depression somatization 
is conceptualized as the relative distribution of somatic to psychological symptom endorsements.  Thus 
an increase in somatic symptom endorsements in an individual whose psychological symptom 
endorsements are low is more suggestive of a somatic expression of depression than when their 
psychological symptom endorsements are high, and this difference is hypothesized to bear on the 
probability of endorsing a psychological screening symptom.  The difference score captures this 
presumed difference, whereas separate variables for somatic and psychological symptom endorsements 





On the other hand, the relationship between the difference score measure and underlying 
depression is potentially over-determined because a person’s underlying depression score and their 
psychological (or somatic) symptom endorsements determines their number of somatic (or 
psychological) symptom endorsements.  Such over-determination could create collinearity between the 
underlying depression and difference score measures.  To circumvent this problem, an internal 
committee member suggested the alternative described above of testing the second hypothesis by: 1) 
putting underlying depression in the first model, but not in the second model, and 2) accounting for 
both somatization and underlying depression in the second model by adding somatic symptom 
endorsements and psychological symptom endorsements as separate measures.  This did not change 
the results, however.  That is, the Black-White odds ratio for endorsing a screening symptom changed in 
the same direction and to the same small degree as in the original test of the second hypothesis 
modeling somatization using the difference score.  
 
Also, Dr. Schwartz and I consulted with Dr. Melanie Wall in Columbia’s Biostatistics department 
to discuss possible issues with having underlying depression and the somatization difference score in the 
same model.  Dr. Wall said this would not be a problem because this was similar to conducting a 
principal components regression analysis. 
 
Age- and sex-standardization 
Black and Whites estimates in all analyses adjusted for the different age and sex distributions in 
the Black and White samples by standardizing to the White age-by-sex distributions in the NLAES sample.  






Age Sex Black unweighted n White unweighted n Weighted Black % Weighted White % 
18-24 M 329 1,606 8.05 6.33 
 F 528 1,755 9.22 6.09 
25-44 M 884 5,978 21.95 21.41 
 F 1,802 7,626 26.46 21.50 
45-64 M 546 3,527 10.15 12.89 
 F 855 4,398 12.52 13.70 
65+ M 341 2,489 4.56 7.50 
 F 670 4,559 7.11 10.58 
Total  5,955 31,938 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Back-up to revised past-year depression prevalences applying the illness/bereavement exclusion to all 
 
In the past-year depression module, only those endorsing a screen symptom and three or more 
additional symptoms were asked the physical illness/bereavement exclusion question.  In this sub-group, 
58.24% of Blacks and 40.42% of Whites endorsed this exclusion.  I applied these percents to those from 
the past-year module who received a depression diagnosis using the alternative algorithm, but who 
were not asked the exclusion question because they had not endorsed a screening question.  
 
The weighted n’s of this latter group were: 
Black: 193,642 x .5824 = 112,312 
White: 876,385 x .4042 = 350,554 
 
These resulting figures (112,312 and 350,554) were then subtracted from the weighted n’s who 
received a diagnosis using the alternative algorithm, to determine what the weighted n would be had 




endorsement patterns by race would be the same between those asked the exclusion question and 
those not asked it.  The revised absolute prevalence figures for the alternative algorithm were: 
 
Black: 719,941 – 112,312 = 607,629 
White: 5,959,944 – 350,554 = 5,609,390 
 
This translates into the following prevalence percentages: 
 
Black: 607,629/20,642,209 = 2.94% 
White: 5,609,390/140,115,224 = 4.00% 
 






Appendix C: Methodological notes on Chapter 4 
 
Age- and sex-standardization 
 
Black and Whites estimates in all analyses adjusted for the different age and sex distributions in 
the Black and White samples by standardizing to the White age-by-sex distributions in the NCS-R sample.  
The table below shows the age-by-sex distributions in the Black (prior to standardization) and White 
NCS-R samples. 
 
Age Sex Black unweighted n White unweighted n Weighted Black % Weighted White % 
18-24 M 42  243 7.75 6.81 
 F 78 264 12.27 5.92 
25-44 M 118 738 18.34 16.87 
 F 201 930 21.81 17.61 
45-64 M 76 592 11.84 15.51 
 F 141 801 16.28 17.83 
65+ M 21 229 4.33 8.34 
 F 40 383 7.38 11.11 
Total  717 4,180 100.00 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
